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PREFACE

To write a thesis is not an easy task.
told that he must be

origin~l

One is

and yet he must speak

with the authority that comes only from wide reading.
He must give every author credit for the use made of
his work and yet he must write in his own style and
language.

Yet to write a thesis is a delightful task,

for one knows that the requirements are ideal and never
fully observed, even by those whose theses become books.
So this work has been to the writer both a difficult
and a delightful task.
I would like to give credit to all upon whom I
have drawn for help.

I have faithfully sought to give

references where authors have been quoted either directly or in summary, but this is not always possible. Sometimes mental notes have been resorted to where card
notes were lacking, and authors' names Wld books have
not always been kept with these mental notes.

But the

books read are listed in the bibliography.
I do want to take this means of expressing my
gratitude to Dr. M. A. Caldwell for his painstaking
help and never-waning sympathy and friendship.

In

the class room and in his home he has blended the
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characteristicB of true teacher and understanding
friend to a degree that is inspiring in retrospect
as it has been in the actual present.
Other friends and teachers have helped in ways
too numerous to mention.

I only hope that I may ex-

press true appreciation and gratitude by making the
best use of their help in further study.
H. W. T.
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2. Of this thesis.

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Fsychology is the middle ground between philosophy and science.

Philosophy deals with the interpre-

tation of facts, with, a view to determining their ultimate cause.

It is the search for knowledge of general

principles--elements, powers, causes and laws--as explaining facts and existences.

Scienoe is systematized

knowledge of facts, laws and proximate causes, gained
and verified by exact observation.

Science is the ef-

fort to show how laws operate, and how certain facts affect other facts.

Philosophy seeks to show why laws

operate as they do, and to discern what is the first
fact.

Soience deals with the sequence of events and

effects and their immediate causes.

Philosoph7 seeks

to go back through a process of reasoning to the first
cause, the uncaused cause, and in terms of that to explain all the series of effects, all the consequent
facts and factors.
and experiments.

Scienoe goes into the laboratory
Philosophy goes to the reason and

theorizes and then seeks proof of those theories through
processes of logic.
its method.

Science is primarily objective in

Philosophy is primarily subjective.

Science

takes phenomena and seeks to discern the facts and factors involved.

Philosophy takes a basic fact, or type-

phenomenon and builds a system around it, or it begins
with conorete faots and seeks to gain from them a philosophic truth.

It may safely be said that philosophy is the

parent, soienoe the offspring.
Between these two great fields of knowledge and
partaking of both is psychology.

Its tendenoy has been

from the philosophical in method and material to the
soientific.
osophical.

In that it deals with the mind it is philBecause it is objective it is scientific.

When it analyzes the states and phases of consoiousness and passes judgment upon the nature and funotions
of the soul it is philosophioal.

When it explains the

workings of the neural, glandular and musoular systems
of the human organism it is soientific.

Psychologists

in general prefer to oall their field a soienoe, and
such it is in the main, but as evidenoe of the fact
that it has always been considered philosophioal the
average oollege or university currioulum may be noted.

I.

Definition.

We have been in the habit of defining psyohology
as the study of the human mind or soul and its operations, powers and functions.

But developments of the

past fifteen years require that we qualify the defini-
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tion by stating which particular school or type of psychology is meant.
er suffices.

The old standard definition no long-

For example, it does not fit behaviorist-

ic psychology.

From the standpoint of this school the

terms of the definition are obsolete, as are the older
methods of study.

It would be quite difficult to give

a definition of psychology that would set forth all the
schools that we have today.

It probably would be so

general that it would be a very poor definition.

It

will not be attempted here.
But since our concern is with behaviorism it is
well enough for us to seek a definition of t his particular school of psychology.
rassed with differences.
the same stripe.

Here a gain we are embarNot all behaviorists are of

What may be true of one group may be

only partly true of another, and not at all true of
still another group.

But we shall never be able to

eliminate differences among thinkers.

watson says be-

havi ori am is Ita natural science that takes the wh ole
field of human adjustments as its own • ••

It is dif-

ferent from physiology only in the grouping of its
probl~s,

not in fundamentals or in central viewpoint.

Physiology is particularly interested in the functioning of parts of the animal--for example, its digestive
system, the circulatory system, the nervous system, the
excretory systems, the mechanics of neural and muscular
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response.

Behaviorism. on the other hand, while it is

intensely interested in all of the functioning of these
parte, is intrinsically interested in what the whole animal will do from morning to night and from night to
morning.- l
To know what the animal will do under certain circumstances or conditions the behaviorist observes his
action under present conditions, analyzes that behavior
in terms of stimulus and response, and then predicts
the behavior of the animal when the stimuli are known.
"The behaviorist asks: Why don't we make what we can
observe the real field of psychology?

Let us limit

ourselves to things that can be observed, and formulate laws concerning only those thin gs.
we observe?

Now what can

Well, we can observe behavior--what the

organism does or says.

And let me make this fundament-

al point at once: that saying is do1ng--that is, behaving.

Speaking overtly or to ourselves (thinking)

is just as objective a type of behavior as baseball.
The rule. or measuring rod, which the behaviorist puts
in front of him always: can I describe this bit of behavior I see in terms of 'stimulus and response'?

By

stimulus we mean any object in the general environment
or any change in the tissues themselves due to the
physiological condition of the animal.

By response

we mean anything the anima l does--such as turning towards
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or away from a

li&~t,

jumping at a sound, and more high-

ly organized activities such as building a skyscraper,
drawing plans; . . . writing books, and the like.- 2
The behaTiorist scorns such terms as consciousness,
mind, soul, instincts, will, emotions, and substitutes
'response'.

These responses, or reactions, he groups

as 'unlearned behavior' and 'learned behavior'.

All

instincts are the results of training or conditioning
--belonging to man's learned behavior. 3 Yet there are
same phases of behavior that he calls unlearned behavior, two of which psychologists have been calling in-

i

stincts,

grasp~ing

and the fear response.

The human

organism is a physical machine which is conditioned by
the environment in which it grows from birth to the
grave.

There is no mind, only a brain, muscles and

glands; no

c~nsciousness,

only reactions to stimuli and

muscular retention of the impressions of those stimuli;
no emotions, only glandular activity; no thinking, only vi sceral response (subvocal talking) to internal or
external stimuli.

In short -the ' doctrine of behavior-

i am can be surnmed up briefly in two statements: (1)
that psychology deals only with what can be observed;
(2) that consciousness is a meaningless term. n4

By

observation the behaviorist means what can be done by a
photographic plate or a spring balance just as well as
by a human being.

?
Extreme behaviorism not only says that we can get
along without the term consciousness, but it goes on to
dogmatize and say that there is no consciousness, that
what we have been calling consciousness is nothing more
nor less than a mechanical response or group of

r~sponses

of a merely physical organism to physical stimuli. There
is, however, a modified behaviorig,m which claims that
psychology can get along without the term consciousness,
but they do not say that there is no consciousness.
Neither do they say that behavior is merely mechanical
response.

They allow for an element of purpose and

choice which comes very near being conscious activity.
We shall have more to say about them a bit later.
It is perhaps worth while to take a few minutes
and a little space to point out that what this thesis
is concerned with is behaviorism, not merely behavior.
All psychologists are agreed that the study of behavior
and the effort to control human activity are the obI

jects of this great field of study.
ity. and it may be conscious,
scious. or unconscious.

Behavior is activ-

semi-conscio~s,

subcon-

Behav10rimn says it is non-

conscious.

II.

History.

Behaviorism is a modern type of psychology.
the newest of the new psychologies.

It is

It began around
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1912 as a bold break of a few men from the traditional

method and terminology of psychology.

Perhaps these

pioneers did not undertake to forecast the results of
what they were initiating.

Certainly they only sought

to establish a new method in psychology.

They urged the

need "of a category common to the physiologist and the
psychologist in terms of which the problems of bodily
and mental function might be discussed without arousing metaphysical prejudices."5

At first it was quite

clear that the behaviorista did not arbitrarily rule
out the mental, or the conscious.

They merely made

the , claim that they could present a system of psychology without the use of these or kindred terms.

Some

even thought that behaviorism would act as a supplement to other psychologies.

Bauden, in the article

quoted above, suggests that "the data derived from the
individual's observation require to be checked by the
data deri ved from observat10nby other lndi viduals here
just as they do elsewhere.

The -scientific standpoint

is always the standpoint of the observer, the third
person's point of view."S
Madam Grace A. DeLaguna, in an article on HEmo_
ti on and Percepti on from the Behan ori st Standpoint"
that appeared in the November 1919 number of the Psychological Review, summed up the status of behaviorism
at that time in the following brief statement.

"At
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present behavioris.m is a program rather than an achievement; a method of approach rather than a theory possessing scientific credentials."

Then she delineated the

new movement as to its sources.

·So far the behavior-

ist movement has had two distinct, if not wholly independent sources.

On the one hand, we find a group of

experimental investigators of animal behavior, occupied
with such problems as that of deterrtining what mode of
response, if any, is called out in a given species by
a given physical stimulus; how given types of reaction
are excited, and how they are modified.

On the

~ther

hand, we find a group of philosophical behaviorists,
who are chiefly concerned with the metaphysical aspects of the new doctrine and who devote themselves almost exclusively to the task of defining consciousness
in terms of behavior.

The two groups of thinkers find

a common ground in their conviction that the study of
mind and the study of behavior are not two things but
one, and that the investigation of the so-called phenomena of consciousness can be fruitfully carried on
only through the study of behavior."
These two sources, or trends, have come together
in the behaviorist of the present time.

He is no long-

er satisfied to term his movement a method or an attitude, but he insists rather dogmatically that his is the
only psychology, the acceptance of which must eliminate
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all differing schools of thought.

At present the status

of behaviorimn appears in three aspects.

There is,

first, the central problem of an unproved hypothesis
which portends radical changes not only in psychology,
but in many kindred fields as well.

The purpose of

this thesis is to follow through sane of the philosophical implications to their logical conclusions.

It is

manifestly impossible to deal with all the problems that
behuTiorism raises.

It would be like following a tap

root through all of its branches in an almost unending
maze.

Second, there is a bold challenge from the be-

haviorists, the extreme proponents particularly, to
all who do not accept their doctrines.

"Show us,"

they say to the subjective psychologists, "that you
have a possible method, indeed that you have a legitimate subject matter.

Prove to us that philosophy and

the social sciences based upon your speculations have
any right to further take up the time and thought of
developing students.· 7
The third aspect is that of the dogmatic claims
that certain results are already being attained by behavioristic teachings.

For example, Watson sees in-

trospective and functional psychology giving way to
behaviorism.

~uite

naturally he feels that behaviorism

will soon be the only psychology known.

He sees phil-

osophy being transplanted by the history of science,
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behaviorimn completely obliterating philosophy.

Ethics,

he thinks, is becoming experimental ethics based entirely upon behavioristic

metho~s.

He sees social psy-

chology "rapidly becoming a behavioristic study of how
groups--family, village, national, church and the like
--build up habits (attitudes) in the individual during
the formative period and thus maintain control of him
throughout life." "Sociology is merging into behavioristic social psychology and into economics."

Religion

is "being replaced among the educated by experimental
ethics."

Psycho-analysis is "being replaced slowly by

behavioristic studies on the human child where scientific methods are being established for conditioning
and unconditioning the child.

When such studies are

carried to an ideal state, there should be no reason
for psychopathic breakdowns or disturbances in the
8

adult. "

The establishment of these claims is a part of
the task ahead of behavioristic psychologists.

Not all

behaviorists are so bold or dogmatic in making them.
Same seem to follow the leading of the extremists with
but a partial understanding, of the consequences involved.
Others, recognizing the trend of the extreme position,
are content to hold a sort of middle ground position,
not denying the validity of introspective psychology
but affir.ming the greater practical value of behavior-
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istic psychology.

III.

Types.

There are several types of behaviorists.
9
al1 gives three and Sellars lO gives four.

McDoug-

There is a

group who grant the existence of facts of consciousness
and that those facts are capable of treatment, apart
from behaTior.

They accept psycho-physical parallel-

ism with emphasis on the physical.
these the near behaviorist.

McDougall calls

He says that they are sep-

arated from what he calls the strict behaviorists by
the fact that they neither deny nor totally ignore the
facts of conscious activity.

"They give the impression

that they would much like to do this, but they have not
the courage of their desires.

They see that to deny

the whole realm of introspectively observable facts is
too flagrantly absurd and that to ignore them may be a
little dangerous.

But they are allied to the Strict

Behaviorism party by their neglect to make use of the
introspectively observable facts and by their acceptance of its tmuscle-twitchism'.

For them every in-

stance of human conduct or animal behavior is merely
a mechanical reflex response to a sensory stimulus; and
they resolutely shut their eyes to all the objective
(as well as the subjective) evi dences that behavior is
a goal-seeking process."
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Another type admits the existence of the facts of
conscious experience but denies that they are suited to
any form of scientific treatment.

This is what Sellars

calls Methodological behaviorism.

It emphasizes animal

psychology.

A third type McDougall calls purposive be-

haviorism, which denies the facts of conscious activity
but . recognizes fully the objectively observable fact
that behavior is obviously a goal-seeking process.
There is a fourth type, which Sellars calls radical behaviorism and McDougall terms strict behaviorism,
which refuses to recognize the facts of consciousness
and denies the goal-seeking nature of behavior.

Their

claim is that behavior can be best explained without any
reference to purpose.

Mind is behavior and nothing else.

This is the extreme position.

It is the type of behav-

iorism that Watson at present is championing.

Walter

S. Hunter ll has elaborated a system which he calls anthroponomy, which is just another name for this type of
behavi ori sm.
Sellars suggests a final type which he calls synthetic behaviorism.

He bases his statement of this

posi ti on partly on the arti cles by Lashley on "Behaviorism and Consciousness" in the Psychological Review
in 1923.

Here mind represents a level of organic re-

sponses and processes centering in the nervous system
and finding expression in muscular activities.
\

The
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total res ponse is behavior.

Mind and consciousness are

worked into the ordinary system of biology.

"Ordinary

self-consciousness and introspection give data to psychology concerning the nature of mental responses.

This

is a monistic, evolutionary position."
In

seeking to follow through some of the philosophi-

cal implications of behaviorism the purpose of this thesis
will be to try to keep in mind the main doctrines of all
the se group s, wi th the emphasi s naturally falling on the
extreme position, strict or radical behaviorism.

IV.

Method.

A word as to method may be in order before going
into the body of the thesis.
ism is objective only.

The method of behavior-

It limits its acquisition of

dat·a to one channel, whi ch per force eliminates the
benefit of a check which an additional approach would
offer.

It may be that this is a fundamental defect of

the whole system.

However, if introspective psychology

can be proved to be false there will remain no alternative but the single-track objective method.

In the

meantime it seems evident that the data of behaviorism
are dependent upon a certain subjective element, whether
ignored or recognized.

The beha viorist who ob serves

the beha vi or of another person under experiment is h imself reacting to stimuli (the stimuli and the re sp on se s
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of the other one become the stimuli to the observer)
and somehow (subjectively?) is interpreting those stimuli and devising laws on the basis of his interpreta°ti ons.

It is di ffi cult to see how it is throughout a

merely objective method after all.

But this will be

discussed in a later connection.
The method adopted here is neither objective nor
subjective as such, but perhaps both.

It is not to be

a laboratory study using experiments, but a logical and
ph;losophical study using the data of the behaviorists.
The desire of the writer is to eliminate prejudice as
far as

pos~ible.

The effort will be to show what fol-

lows if the claims of behaviorism are true, following
these claims out to their logical conclusions.

These

conclusions may have something to do with the validity
of the claims.
cally.

But the claims are to be tested logi-

The central and determining principle here is

that any theory to gain scientific support must, in
its methods and conclusions, accord with the fundamental
and generally established principles of science.
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CHAPTER II
MET AFHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS

The relation between philosophy and psychology
has already been suggested.

It is an intimate rela-

tion, so much so that any radical change in one's acceptance of psychology calls for a corollary change in
his system of philosophy.

Indeed philosophy is the

field of thought that makes use of all other fields
of thought.

It is "an attempt to gain unity in our

.t hinking."

It is, according to Herbert Spencer, com-

pletely unified knowledge, whereas science is partially unified knowledge.

It seeks to bring all the

sciences into a unified system.
understand the world and life.

It is an attempt to
It seeks to correlate

and combine the results of all the sciences into a
world view that will satisfactorily answer the questionings of the human mind as to the use, meaning, purpose
and value of life. l According to Dr. Ribben, 2 "the
problems of philosophy are, in fact, the problems of
life, the burden and mystery of existence, the origin
and destiny of man, the relations which he sustains to
the world of which he is a part, and to the unseen universe which lies round about him."

Any theory of the mind affects the theory of life
that the mind holds.

Herein arises the relation be-

tween behavioristic psychology and metaphysics.

A

more detailed discussion of the behaviorist's view of
the mind will be reserved for a later place in this
chapter.

Here it is enough to point out that his

theory of the mind in general is that it is a system
of reactions to external and internal stimuli.

Meta-

physics, or ontology, is a branch of philosophy that
deals with ultimate reality.

There has always been

considerable difference of opinion as to the function
and character of this phase of philosophy.

"Before

Kant's time there was a very general tendency to build
up theories of the nature of things on the basis of a
priori reasoning.

Certain metaphysical principles were

assumed to be necessary, and the acceptance of these
principles led to the deduction of various propositions
which were held true of reality as it is in itself, i.e.,
of reality as it exists without relation to the condition of our experience.

This method of procedure is

called dogmatism, and the metaphysics thus developed is
dogmatic or rationalistic metaphysics."

This may be

dualistic, as exemplified by Descartes, or monistic, as
seen in the system of Leibnitz and Hobbes.
If we could conceive of a negative dogmatic metaphysics that would probably be the type that extreme be-
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havioriRm would offer.

It moves upon the a priori as-

sumption that there is no consciousness, or mind, or
soul, and builds a dO@natic system around this negation.

The denial of consciousness is not a conclusion

that the behaviorist reaches after a series of experiments, but it is his assumption fram which he deduces
all the doctrines of his system.

His experiments mere-

ly serve to support those conclusions.
reasoning.

That is a priori

One needs only to glance through a behavior-

ist's book to see that it is a dogmatic system.
There are philosophers who hold to a type of metaphysics called empiricism.

They derive their knowledge

of reality from experience and not from a priori principles.

The experience that behaviorism knows is ex-

pressed in terms of stimuli and response, and these are
in ter.ms of the general premise, or the assumption referred to above.

still another group holds that, while

there is an ultimate reality, it cannot be reached by
human faculties.

These faculties do not present us

with the real as it is in itself, but with the results
of their elaboration.

Behaviorism denies that we have

any faculties, save the muscles and glands of the physical organism which respond in a certain manner under
certain conditions.
If the assumptions of behaviorism are true then
what is ultimate reality?

Will the conclusions of this
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school of psychology have anything to do with the conclusions of philosophy as to reality?

There are three

general philosophical theories of reality: monism, dual.
ism, and pluralism.

These theories represent the desire

of the human mind for unity in plurality, to find the
one in the many.

For our purpose here it is well enough

to consider these theories in the following order: dual.
ism, pluralism, and monism.

I.

Dualism.

The word dualism is somewhat ambiguous, being used
in philosophy in two senses.

It is sometimes used to

designate the belief in a good and a bad principle
which lie at the root of all things.

This particular

kind of dualism we may consider later in connection with
the implications of behaviorism that bear upon ethics.
The other sense in which the word is used is the theory
that the universe as a whole can only be explained with
two fundamentally different kinds of constituent elements.

In ancient philosophy these two elements were

matter and form, while in modern times they are mind
and matter.

Descartes distinguiShed between thinking

substance (mind) and extended BUbstance ,(matter).

The

difficulty which this view inevitably raises is to explain how mind and matter interact as they apparently
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do in experience.

One of the earliest attempts to solve

this difficulty resulted in the denial of interaction
and the claim of concomitance of variations. under divine control.

"This simply puShed the difficulty a

step farther back.

If mind cannot act upon matter.

then God, conceived as mind. cannot act upon matter;
but conceived as other than mind. cannot act upon mind."'
A possible modern solution of the difficulty is parallelism, which holds the concomitance of brain processes and
mental processes, but denies that there is any relation
of cause and effect between the two.
But how does extreme behavioristic psychology handle
this difficulty?

It is quite evident that for this kind

of behaviorism the difficulty does not exist.

There is

no relation between mind and matter, for there is no
mind apart from matter.

What we have been calling mind

is merely the type of reaction of the organism to the
stimulus which, or the results of which, we have observed.

This reaction may be muscular, visceral or

glandular, but in any case it is a part of the physical
organism, and not a mind or consciousness that is apart
from and yet within the organism.

And so the radical be-

havioristic psychologist cannot hold to philosophical
dualism.

The two are irreconcilable.
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II.

Pluralism.

Another philosophical theory of reality is pluralism.

This is the view that reality cannot be reduced

either to one or two ultimate forms of being.
is many.

Reality

This theory runs all the way from Empedocles,

about 450 B. C.--who held that the four ultimate elements of reality are earth, air, fire, and water--down
to the present day.
general

fo~s:

Pluralism today is found in two

that of William James, which was the

result of his radical empiricism, and the philosophy
of the New Realism.

The

fo~er

emphasized the per-

ceptual flux, with such realities as beginnings, ends,
indeteroinations, eYil, crises, catastrophes and escapes, a real God and a real moral life. 5
emphasizes the world of reason,

th~ught

and

The latter
values.

-Physical and mental things, events and processes are
real in this realistic pluralistic system, but so also
are principles of reason, lOgical principles, internal
and external relations, numbers, space, time, series,
and such ideal entities as justice and beauty.

These

latter non-physical and non-mental entities we may, if
we choose, call sUbsistents, if we wish to limit the
term existent things to such as are conditioned by
~ace and time.· 6
Behaviorism has no place for subsistents.

It

neither provides nor implies any way of knowing objects
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independently of space and time.
physical
uli.

orga~ism

The reactions of the

are only determined by physical stim-

The claim of the behaviorist that given the stim-

ulus he can predict the response, or given the response
he can describe the stimulus, precludes the possibility
of holding

eith~r

of these types of pluraliam.

Since

all human activity is physical response the organism
has no capacity for receiving any other than a physical
stimulus.

Thus even man's thinking (what the behavior-

ist calls sub-vocal talking) is concerned only with physical objects.

The moral life, the conception of God,

principles of reason, justice, beauty and such like are
not realities but phases of the mechanical adjustments
'of the organi em.
There is also a pluralistic Idealism which should
be

g1 ven

a place in thi s grouping.

It is perhaps best

set forth in the extreme Idealism of Berkeley.

Reality,

he said, consists of minds, spirits and souls, plus
their ideas.

God, the infinite Spirit exists, and a

realm of finite s pirits, but the objects we call material
are merely objects of experience.

This is pluralistic

in the sense that it considers each spirit as having its
own world in its own ideas.

Leibnitz contended that the

ohjects we see about us and that we study in science have
real existence inde pendent of the

ID~nd

that per ceives

them; but that when we come to examine into their real
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nature we find that in their inner being they are mental
or spiri tual.

He deve loped hi s system along the lines

of the old atomic theory, holding that all objects of
sense are made up of certain ultimate units, which he
called Monads.

Physical bodies are comp osed of Monads

over which the soul 1B the governing Monad.

These, and

all other types of Idealism, may be included in the

d1~

cussion given below in relation to the effect of the
conclusions of radical behaviorism upon Idealistic philosophies.
With these types of pluralism ruled out by behaviorism there are only two alternatives left.

Either

there may be a pluralism of only material realities, or
behaviorism leads to some for.m of monism.

A pluralism

of only material realities is not a pluralism at all,
but one substance in many for.ms and manifestations.

III.

Moni sm.

The third general theory of reality is Moni sm.
This view also takes two forms, Idealism and Materialism.

Idealism puts the emphasis upon mind, as in some

way prior to matter.
tha~

It holds that mind is real and

matter is only an appearance.

There are several

types of Idealism, running from Plato down to the
present day.

Plato's Idealism was not extreme in the

sense that there is nothing in the universe but mind.
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He taught rather that the significant things of the universe, the real things, are Ideas, and by Ideas he did
not mean merely mental states.

"He meant real object-

ive things or 'forms' which are not material."'

They

are patterns or standards for the things of sense. These
patterns, such as beauty, truth, justice, and goodness
are the cosmic realities, while what we call matter he
ter.med non-being, not that it does not exist, but it
does not have significance.
of idealism.

Panpsychi~

is another type

According to this view, as the word indi-

cates, all reality is psychic in nature.

This solves

the mind-body problem on the basis of correlation between mind and brain.

The mind is the sole reality,

the body is its outer appearance.
Voluntaristic Idealism reduces the universe to absolute will.
will.

The physical world is but an expression of

Kant made the distinction between the noumenal

and phenomenal realms.

The phenomenal world is the ob-

jective world of our experience.

The noumenal is the

realm of reality back of phenomena.
Ding an Sich, or thing-in-itself.
Absolute Idealism.

Kant called it the
Finally, there is

Fichte taught that reality is swal-

lowed up in the ego, the Absolute Ego, the supreme
reality.

Hegel said that reality is reason.

is a great thought process.

The world

"What we call nature is

thought externalized; it is the Absolute Reason reveal-
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ing itself in outward form.
goal.

But nature is not its final

Returning, it expresses itself more fully in

~.

man self-consciousness and in the end finds its complete realization in art, religion, and philosophy.u S
Now, what of behaviorism and these types of Idealism?

In the first place let us examine behaviorism a

bit more thoroughly than we have done with reference to
the place it gives mind.

watson regards mind as a

passing and useless concept.

In the place of the 'con-

cept mind' he would have a description of the way the
whole body behaves.

To show the needlessness of the term

'mind' he describes a fanciful picture of a dog trained
to spurn

~resh

steak and to eat decayed fish.

By use of

electric shocks he was trained to fear and avoid female
doge.

Through other processes he was made over into a

whining, growling, emaciated specimen of canine flesh
and bonee.

Then, (without referring to the dog'e mind)

he trains him to be friendly with other dogs and with
man, to eat fresh meat and to sleep naturally, until
finally watson sees his imaginary dog t&ke the blue
ribbon in a show over the best bred and pedigreed and
moet intelligent dogs of the land.

ThuB would watson

meet the needs of the mentally sick man.

We are not

concerned here with the question of mental diseases,
whether there are any such and how to cure them (it is
in this connection that watson introduces the above il-
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lustration) , but this indicates the point we are searching for here in our study.

He allows no place for mind

in his system of psychology.

He does not find any evi-

dence of it, and should he stumble across some signs
that point to the presence of a mind he could not deal
with it without disrupting his whole scheme.
As has already been pointed out there are behaviorists and behaviorists and they cannot all be put under the same label.

The only way we have of knowing be-

havioriRm is through its proponents.

It is evident that

some of these are more liberal toward the mind concept
than the extremists.

For example, Bauden ,says that mind

is behavior of a certain sort.

"It is behavior iq which

certain objects which serve as excitants are undergoing
experimental reconstruction into stimuli adequate to the
incipient response.

It is behavior in which certain at-

titudes are undergoing reorganization into adequate atten ti anal di scriminati on of the response.· 9 He goes
further in this strain to define psychology as "the
science of the behavior of organisms in so far as they
exhibit mentality.

Behavior--not all behavior, but

be~

havior in so far as it presents the character of the
mental as distinguished from the chemical, the physical,
the vital.

Mentality--behavior in its aspect as in-

ducing fresh forms of it self. "10
Wieman says that "mind or mentality means a certain
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mode of doing things on the part of an organism. "II He
gives an illustration from Holtl s "The Freudian Wish"
of a man who is fond of mushrooms.

He finds some but

is afraid to eat them le st he should get same of the
poisonous species.

He is in a conflict of emotions.

The basis of adjustment is the ability to distinguish
between the good and the poisonous mushrooms.

"Men-

tality," he then concludes, "is the process by which
vari ous stimulated tendencies of the organi em are adjusted to the execution of a series of movements resulting in adaptation to the environment.

Ite mode of op-

eration is the organization of diffusive tendencies into
a definite system under the 'control of e orne dominant
propensity having an instinctive basis.

This propensi.

ty oonsists either of an innate series of reflexes or
of Borne system of tendencies which has been organized
in the past experience of the individual and which persists as an established physiological motor set." 12
This is not the language of a radical or strict behaviorist, for there is too much imp ortance attached to
attention and instinct.

watson would brush this aside

and go back to the question of stimuluB and response,
with the response conditioned only by previous stimuli.
Mind and consciousness are kindred terms.
they are used synonymously.

By many

To say the least, they are

two concepts that are hard to define.

The strict be-
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haviorists make a great deal of this difficulty, arguing that it is due to a fundamental error, namely, an
effort to define something that doesn't exist.

What-

eTer the definition may be it is surely agreed that one's
psychological interpretation of consciousness deter.mines
largely his philosophical interpretation of reality. That
is our purpose in seeking some sort of definition here.
The Relational Theory of consciousness, as first
formulated by Woodbridge, holds

t~at

"Consciousness is

the result of the interaction between the organism and
its eurroundings.- l3 Colvin and Bagley describe consciousness in the following terms.

-It is therefore

reasonable to assume that consciousness puts in an appearance when it is required to aid behavior.

The ser-

vice that consciousness renders 1s to adjust the organism better to its surroundings.

When there is perfect

adjustment there is no need of consciousness; when, however, the organism is not so adjusted, then consciousness is necessary in securing a better adjustment.- l4
Such a description is far fram identifying consciousness and physical behavior.

The position represented

by Eliott P. Frost is an advance step in the behavioristic tendency.

He says, -energy is stored in some

mOdified fashion by past experience; it is put in
action by the stimulus now

affect~ng

the organism; its

result is to modify the machinery of behavior in terms
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of that past experience.

This is what and this is all

that psychology oan mean by conscious processes."l5
This leads logioally to the position represented by
Lashley.

"The concept of consciousness,· he says, "is

then, that of a complex

integration and succession of

bodily activities which are closely related to or involve the verbal and gestural mechanisms and hence most
frequently come to social expression.

The element,s of

content are the processes of reaction to stimulation
-and do not di ffer in essenti al mechani em from the spinal
reflex of the decapitated animal to the most complex
adaptive activity of man."16
There we have the place that radical behaviorism
provides for mind or consciousness.

They are but vague

terms that other psychologists use to designate what
the behaviorist thinks of as the action of the whole organism.

And so it is quite plain that he would not em-

brace Platonic Idealism, tor he reacts only to material
objects (what Plato called the non-being). and he would
never get the significance or forms or ideas of those ·
objects.

In like manner the subjective Idealism of

Berkeley means nothing to the behaviorist, for he does
not believe in the existence of minds or spirits or
souls.

So also with Leibnitzts Monadology and with

Panp sychf em , and Voluntari stio, Kantian, .and Absolute
Idealism.

When behaviorism drops all reference to the
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mind and reduces what we have called mental activity to
physical behavior it also closes all doors that lead to
philosophic Idealism.
There is, however, a modern type of philosophy
which is not monistic but is very close kin to Idealism.

It is Personalism.

ity is personality.

It holds that ultimate real-

Prof. Ralph Tyler Flewelling, in

his book "Creative personality,- points out that reality must abide and yet undergo change.
ality meets this test.

Only person-

Material objects have signifi-

cance only as they come in contact with persons.

They

exist, but not for meaning apart from persons.

Space

has no meaning save as persons relate objects.

Time

is meaningless save as persons relate events in past,
present and future time.

Motion is a fallacy unless it

is gauged by some person.

Ideas are but the thoughts

of persons.
Now, the behaviorist defines personality ae "the
sum of activities that can be discovered by actual observation of behavior over a long enough time to give
reliable information.

In other words, personality is
but the end product of our habit systems •• 17 By habit
he means repetition of conditioned response until it
occurs readily upon a very slight stimulus.

All such

conditioned responses constitute what we call personality.

There is no will in personality, though one
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type of moderate behaviorists
element in human activity.

~dmits

a goal-seeking

Yet it is difficult to see

how there oan be any purpose or goal-seeking in behavior without some element of what we oall conscious
activity.

This definition of personality also leaves

out emotions.

watson defines emotion as "an hereditary

'pattern-reaction' involving profound changes of the
bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly of the
visceral and glandular systems.- lS

If such a definition

means anything, it is that emotion has nothing whatsoever to do with what we have been calling conscious
activity, but that it is another name for physical response.

And so personality is not a factor but a re-

sult of physical stimuli.

The only thing necessary to

change personality is to have the stimuli strong enough.
Thus personality does not abide, but changes with conditione.

Then there is no supreme personality as ulti-

mate reality, but for every personality there must be
greater stimuli to evoke the responses that make the
personality.
2. Materialism.
The other type of monism is materialism.

It 1s

the view that the world is best explained as a redistribution of matter, that there is nothing in the world
but matter, that mind 1s a for.m or a function of matter.
Fram Democritus on Materialism has ffequently taken the
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form of Atomism, indeed the two terms have at times been
used interchangeably.

Here all matter is thought of as

consisting of an almost infinite number of particles,
called atoms, which whirl about in space, thus giving not
one basal concept as monism requires, but three--atoms,
space and motion.
These concepts have led to the modern type of materi ali sm known as Naturali em or posi ti vi em.

I t places

more emphasis upon the mechanical character of the
world process and less upon the substantial ground of
the world.

This is the emphasis of the physical sciences

upon philosophy.

Indeed positivism limits philosophy

to the results of the natural sciences.

This is· to be

expected when all other methods and subject matter than
those of physical science are discarded.

The only

philosophy that can fit into such restrictions is
mechanism, and this is about the only type of materialism to be found in the present age.

Perhaps it should

be said that mechanistic philosophy is not so popular
among philosophers as it is among scientists who have
ventured into the field of philosophy.
Every system of philosophy must have some type
phenomenon or basic assumption upon which it builds
and fram which are ultimately drawn all its conclusions.
If an extreme behaviorist should have a philosophy it
would have to be in terms of the stimulus-response for.mu-
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lao

That would be his type phenomenon.

He claims that

given the stimulus he can predict the response, or given
the response he can describe the stimulus.

He also

claims that all responses of the human organism are
solely physical adjustments to those stimuli.

Over

these responses there is no human intel l igence ruling.
Only as we are conditioned by certain stimuli can we
rise to greater and nobler responses.

The implication

in these claims is that there is no spirit nature in
man.

It is even more than an implication, for the

radical behaviorist brushes aside the mind concept and
consciousness.

For him the organism is made up of the

sense organs, the reacting organs, consisting of the
striped muscles, the unstriped muscular system of the
viscera and the glands; and the nervous system, whiCh
consists of the brain, spinal cord and the peripheral
nerves which run from sense organs into brain and spinal
cord and thence to the muscles and glands.
place in all

t h~s

There is no

system for any semblance of the spirit

nature of man.
Extreme behaviorism goes yet farther and eliminates the spirit outside man.

Since man is capacitated

only to respond physically it is inconceivable that a
spiritual stimulus would call forth any response at all.
Hence man cannot know anything about a spiritual world
or a spiritual being if there is any such.

The behav-
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iorist claims that man is equipped only with the learned
and unlearned response system of the organism, and can
only observe that which comes to him in the form of
stimuli.

Thus his philosophy would have to be material-

istic, and, since he places more emphasis upon the process of conditioning and response it must be mechanistic.

His laws are the laws of the conditions and re-

sponses, and so if he should observe that certain laws
operate in the universe he would conclude that they
were the resultants of certain conditions, which in
turn resulted fram certain other conditions, and so on
back in an infinite regress.
When we say that radical behaviorism is materialistic and mechanistic we may expect a protest fran same
of its adherents.

Lashley answers, ·perhaps it is such,

to the extent that modern physics and physiology are
materialistic, but the word materialism implies a metaphysical theory of reality, whereas these sciences are,
at least in their systematic treatment, altdgether phenomanological.

Psychophysical dualism and epiphenom-

enalism do imply theories of the ultimate nature of
mind and matter, but behaviorism claims to avoid this
and to attempt nothing more than a logical and a mathematical description of experience such as is presented
by the physical sciences.

To stigmatize this as materi-

alism is to appeal against behaviorism to the prejudices
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aroused by a crude metaphysic which is nowhere implied
in its doctrines.- l9

We reply in his own words.

-The

acceptance of a physical world seems to me to involve
as a corollary a behavioristic psYChOlogy._20

That is

a rather clear and positive implication that the behaviorist has a theory concerning ultimate reality.

It

behaviorism is the loglcal corollary of the acceptance

ot a physical world, then behaviorism must be built
upon the assumption that there is nothing but a physical world.
The behaviorist may suggest that the physical
world is not necessarily matter, that it may be energy.
Could a behaviorist hold a philosophy of energetics and
deny materialism?

Ostwald propounded the theory that

"the various properties of matter are special forms of
energy (kinetic, thermal, chemical, magnetic, electric,
etc.), which cannot be reduced to one another.

Psychic

energy is another form of energy; it is unconscious or
conscious nervous energy.

Interaction is explained as

the transition fram unconscious to conscious energy or
the reverse."2l

Thus it seems that energy is an at-

tribute by virtue of which matter can effect changes in
other matter.

Philosophy is primarily interested in

the quali tati ve, rather than the quanti.tati ve, attribute of reality.

Perhaps that explains the fact that

the theory of energetics has been left largely to the
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field of the exact sciences, principally physics and
chemistry.

At any rate the behaviorist would have no

place in his philosophy for the theory of energetics,
for everything that man knows is reduced to a part of
the physical (muscular) organimm.

Energy, then, for

the behaviorist is a secondary consideration, the conditioning of the muscular organization being primary.
This primary concern must be the type-phenomenon by
whiCh we characterize a philosophy.
In the same manner would critical naturalism be
automatically set aside by strict behaviorism.

This

form of naturalism rejects the qualitative constancy
of substance and holds that it can only be quantitative.
"In order that such a version of science shall yield
a naturalistic philosophy, it is necessary to show that
nature so construed coincides with knowable reality.
This conclusion may be arrived at in one or both of two
ways.

It may be argued that the ultimate qualitative

terms of experience are somehow physical, or

a~

any

rate such as to permit of being explained only in terms
of physical theories; or it may be argued that physical
theories are the only verifiable, and
theories.
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the only valid,

In other words, the priority of physical

science may be argued from the nature ot fact or from
the nature of method.
represented by

The for.mer of these motives is

~ensationalism,'and

the latter by 'ex-

perimentalism.,·22

It would seem, fram this brief pre-

sentation, that critical naturalism would be the philosophical outcome of behaviorism.

But the behaviorist

can only know nature as it becames a part of his muscular organism through his responses to stimuli.

To

talk about energy in matter and prior to matter would
be too speculative and metaphysical for the behaviorist.

He is satisfied in dealing with muscles and

glands, as one moulds clay, and brushes aside every
other explanation of human activity.

If there is

nothing else to human behavior but manipulation of
muscles and glands (without mind, spirit, or nervous
energy), how can we arrive at any different theory of
the nature that is external to us?
Watson in his system of behaviorism is not so
modest as Lashley.

In his definition he claims the

Whole field of human activity.

That certainly implies

a theory concerning man's knowledge of reality.
goes further and repudiates philosophy.

He

Now it is com-

monly accepted that the most presumptuous system of
philosophy is that which denies that we can know anything about reality.

The implication is that one must

know a great deal about reality to be able so to limit
it in man's thinking.

Behaviorism claims to be able to

analyze all of man's relations and to predict the responses of the human organism, as you would predict the
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action of your automobile when you feed it gas and oil
and apply electricity.
mechanistic philosophy.

The basis ot that claim is a
McDougall says that most be-

. haviorists were mechanists first and behaviorists secondari ly only.23

"Behavi orism is the consequence," he

says, "of carrying the mechanizing tendency in psychology to its logical conclusion, and indeed to a
point some distance beyond its logical conclusion."24
AS a further support of this position the behaviorist has called in a theory of evolution that is both
materialistic and mechanistic.

"Through the process

of evolution," says Watson, "human beings have put on
sense organs--specialized areas where special types
of stimuli are most effective--such as the eye, the
ear, the nose, the tongue, the skin and semi-circular
canals.

To these must be added the whole muscular

system, both the striped muscles
muscles.

~d

the unstriped

The muscles are thus not only organs of re-

sponse--they are sense organs as well.,,25

This sounds

very much as if watson is holding to the theory of evolution that is most convenient for his scheme.
li~~t

In the

of his doctrine of behaviorism it would seem that

his theory is a mixture of Lamarck's inheritance of
acquired characters and Darwin's natural selection. He
has nothing to say about causes and so his view appears
to be Darwinian.

He speaks of inheritance of physical
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characteristics, though he does not show that acquired
physical characteristics are inherited.

He speaks of

the child of a musician who gives promise of becoming a
great pianist.

It is not the child's talent for music

that he has inherited from his father, but his long
taperin g fingers that make it easy for him to handle
the key board.

The fact that he has such fingers leads

the fond parent to gi ve him special attenti on and the
very best training, until he becomes a greater musician
than his father.

Now the behaviorist is not interested

primarily in the biological or philosophical question
of where the father got his long tapering fingers. Our
inference would be that he got them from his father,
and he from his father, and so on back until we would
have to come to some stimulus that would call forth a
reaction that would necessitate the elongation of the
fingers.
But Watson gives us another illustration of a
father Who is ambitious that his child shall became a
~

great musician, but the child has short stubby fingers.
Not to be outdone by such a difficulty the father has
a piano built to fit the boy's hands.

With such a per-

fect physical fit the boy is ready to thrill the world
with his musical genius.

This is another of Watson's

f.anciful pictures, but it serves to indicate where his
thinking would lead us in philosophy.

If it is merely
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a matter of the length of the fingers and long musical
fingers are acquired through a process of evolution,
why wouldn't the lad develop long fi.ngers through a
process of reaching for the key board of a piano that
is built for long fingers?

But if the piano must be

built to fit the size of the boy's fingers surely
physical characters cannot be acquired, and so Lamarck's
theory of the inheritance of acquired physical characters must be rejected.

The only other theory of

evolution that harmonizes with the above statement of
Watson is Darwinism.

my philosophy that is based upon

that view must be mechanistic.
What then is the type of philosophy to which behaviorism leads?

We have eliminated Pluralism, Ideal-

ism and Personalism because the behaviorist eliminates
mind from his thinking.

As stated above, the strict

behaviorist disclaims having any philosophy at all, but
we need not tarry with that, for the mere fact that he
denies having a philosophy and rearranges the fields of
knowledge to sui t hi s scheme is prima faci e proof that
he has a rather distinct form of philosophy.

In the

light of the above discussion I believe we can see that
it is a monistic and mechanistic materialism.

Amore

dogmatic or closed system of philosophy 1s difficult to
conceive.

But it is characteristic of behaviorism to

be dogmatic, and its tendency is toward a closed system.
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It leaves the universe a hopeless problem, worse than
Haeokel's riddle.

It leaves the problem of man un-

solved as to origins and future.

Indeed it solves the

problem of man by denying that there is a problem.

44

REFERENCES, CHAPTER II

1. G. T. W. Patrick, "Introduction to Philosophy,"

chapter I.
2. John Grier Hibben, "The Problems of Philosophy,· p.
3, (quoted by Patrick, p. 9).
3. The New International Encyclopedia, vol. 15, p. 489.

4.

~.

s1!., vol.

17, p. 346.

5. William James, "The Will to Believe," p. IX.
6. G. T. W. Patrick,
7.

1.B19:.,

~. ~.,

p. 259.

p. 240.

8. Ibid., p. 248.

9. H. H. Bawden, "The Presuppositions of Behaviorist
Psychology," Psych. Rev. 1918, p. 189.
10.

~.,

p. 190.

11. H. M. Wilman, "The Nature of Mentality," Psych. Rev.,

May 1919, p. 230.
12.

~.,

p. 245 f.

13. H. H. Bawden, Ope cit., p. 181.
14. Colvin & Bagley, "Human Behavior," p. 16 f.
15. Eliot P. Frost, "Cannot Psychology Dispense with
Conscience?" Psych. Rev. 1914, p. 252.
16. K. S. Lashley, "Behaviorism and Consciousness,"
Psych. Rev., 1923, p. 341.

45

17. J. B. Watson, "Behaviorism," p. 220.
18.

~,

"Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behavior-

i st ," p. 215.

19. K. S. Lashley, ..2.l2.
20. J.:2!.g., p. :343

ill., p.

241.

f.

21. Frank Thilly, "A History of Philosophy," p. 493.
22. R. B. Perry, ·Present Philosophical Tendencies," p. 76.
23. William McDougall, "Purposive or Mechanical Psychology,· PEYchological Review, 1923, p. 274.
24.

". !lli., p. 278.

25. J. B. Watson, "Behaviorism,- p. " 12.

CHAPTER

III

LOGICAL IHPLICATIONS

I.

As to thinking and thought.
1. General definition.
2. Behaviorist's definition.
3. Reasoning.
(1) The behaviorist's definition of 'solution.'
(2) Memory and imagination.
4. Peroepts and oonoepts.

II.

Deduoti on.
1. Definition--Twofold effeot of behaviorisn on
logioal definition.
2. Assumptions.

III.

Fallaoies involved.

Induotion.
1. De fi ni t ion.
2. Can we gain oertainty through induotion?
3. False induotion.

Conolusion.

CHAPTER

III

LOGICAL IMPLICArIONS

Logic is the science ot thought.

It is the field

of organized knowledge that revolves about the principles
and conditions of correot thinking.
ive thinking about thought."

It is thus "reflect-

It is a branoh of philosophy

that pervades all fields of thought.
which controls all the sciences.

It is the science

Consoiously or uncon-

sciously, intentionally or unintentionally, we use logic
every day in every form of study.

Its plaoe in psychol-

ogy and philosophy is oentral and of exoeeding importanoe.
Since psyohology deals with behavior, mind and oonsoiousness it is patent that it inoludes thinking, the realm
of logio.

And sinoe behaviorism is oonoerned with the

behavior of the entire human organism it is evident that
it inoludes thinking.

So there is much that psychology

and logio have in oommon, and there is naturally
same overlapping.

Yet there is a marked distinction be-

tween the two fields, chiefly in method and aim.

Psy-

chology uses the method of observation and experimentation, and seeks to give a description and explanation of
its data.
try.

To this extent it is like biology and chemis-

Yet it must also reflect upon the results of its

4?

observations and experiments.

Logic is rather analytic

in examining thought, wnerever found, to determine the
form and principles of 'valid thinking.'

Psychology

studies the brain and neural processes involved in
t~inking,

while logic studies the principles of think-

ing with a view to improving it.

These principles are

established and recognized as standards of thinking and
ali of us desire to measure up to them.

Logic does not

deal with the capacities of man for thought save to
train and sharpen them.
Logic has ever been regarded as one of the fields
of philosophy along with ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics
and the theory of knowledge.

Its importance has grown

and its value has become felt to such an extent that it
has assumed almost a determinative place in philosophy.
Certain forms of logic lead to certain types of philosophy.
Indeed it has beoome a field of scienoe to itself with its
own subject matter.

"It is interested in the laws of

thought, the nature of proof, the rules of evidence;

it

desires to see how knowledge is built up and how the parts
of knowledge depend upon one another."l
ps~chology

Its relation to

and philosophy is so intimate that it is worth

while and well within the province of this thesis to ask
what effect the conclusions of behaviorism will have upon
the prinoiples of logic.

I. Thought.
Thinking has been defined as problem solving. Dewey2 sees four different ways in which the terms thought
and thinking are employed.

There is first the broad

use, designating everything that comes to mind.

To

think of a thing is just to be conscious of it in any
way.

Then there is a restricted use in which whatever

is presented directly through the senses is excluded.
Then there is a third meaning that is limited to beliefs
that rest upon some kind of evidence.

In cases where

the ground, or basis, for beliefs is delib erately
sought and its adequacy examined the fourth
reflective thought, is found.

type~

or

In other words, thought

is relating ideas in the effort to solve the problems
in such a way as to lead to the discovery and proof of
the solution.
t~ought

Such, in general, 1s the definition of

that logic offers.

The behaviorist says that thinking is sub-vocal
talking.

He Madvances the view that what psychologists

have hitherto called thought is in short nothing but
talking to ourselves.

The evidence for this view 1s ad-

mittedly largely theoretical but it is the one theory so
far advanced which explains thought in terms of natural
science.

I wish here expressly to affirm that in devel-

oping this view I have never believed that the laryngeal
movements as such played the predominating role in

thought.

• • • We have all had the proofs before us time

and again that the larynx can be removed without completely destroying a person's ability to think.
~

Remov-

al of the larynx does destroy articulate speech but it
does not de stroy whi spered speech.

Wh1 spered speech

(without articulation) depends upon muscular movements
of the Cheek, tongue, throat and chest--organization
which, to be sure, has been built up with the use of
the larynx. but which remains ready to function after
the larynx has been removed.

My theory does hold that

the muscular habits learned in overt speech are responsible for implicit or internal speech (thought) •

..

Again, after our overt speech habits are for.med, we are
constantly talking to ourselves (thought).

New com-

binations occur, new complexities arise, new substitutions take place--for example, where the shrug of the
shoulders or the movement of any other bodily part
becomes substituted for a word.

Soon any, and every
bodil~ response may become a word substitute.- 3
watson sees support of his theory in the child's
behavior. 4 He talks incessantly when alone. Soon society restrains his talking aloud, and the overt speech
dies down to whispered speech, and finally to speech
behind closed lips (thought).

Thinking, then, accord-

ing to the strict behaviorist. is the subvocal use of
words which have already been babitized.

These words
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are the substitutes for the objects that have stimulated us, and so we are enabled to carry those objects around with us.

We possess these objects (words) as we

respond to the stimuli that they constitute for us.
"Verbal, manual and laryngeal activities become organized together as parts of the total habit system we
form around each object and situation in the world we'
live in.-5 And 60 it is evident th~t for the strict
behaviorist thinking is a matter of the activity of the
physical organiEm.

It is no more, no less.

The responses

of the organism to the stimuli are the effect of the stimuli upon the striped or skeletal muscular system, the unstriped muscular system or the viscera, and the glandular system.

All these systems are active when the or-

ganizm responds to stimuli in what we call talking. When
a word is substituted for an object it makes an impression
upon the muscular or glandular

syst~

is intensified by repetition.

For every object we have

.

and that impression

a word substitute and so we carry the world around with
us as an actual part of our bodily organization.

The

organism can manipulate these words in the throat or
larynx, but it is physical activity and not mental. This
manipulation is thinking for the extreme behaviorist. If
we ask him who does the manipulating he answers "the organi sm."

If we ask him why this manipulating is done he

answers that it is because certain stimuli evoke that
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type of response.

If we ask him if there is any design

or purpose in it his logical answer would be no.
somewhat like spinning a top.

It is

There is a stimulus that

acts as the string to set the top in motion and it continues in that same kind of motion until the effect of
the stimulus dies down.
If the radical behaviorist is right and thinking
"

is no more than such manipulati on· what is the value of
logic?

The implication is that logic can only be the

study of the manipulation of these muscles to lead to
better thinking.

But there would be no principles to

guide, for a principle is not an object and so would
. have no word substi tute and would leave no muscular impression.

LOgic then would be a science of physical

mechanics.

Thinking would be problem solving of the

trial and error type.

There is, however, a serious gap

right here that either behaviorism or behavioristic logic
would have to fill.

It must be proved, and it hasn't

been done yet! that thought is identical with muscular
action.

It is interesting to talk about the muscles

that are employed in talking and then to say that thinking is the same thing, but saying so does not prove
that they are identical.

What about the man who is

called on for an exterporaneous speech and as he is
talking he is thinking ahead of what he is to say next?
But the behaviorist would say that that is only the evi-
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dence of the introspectionist.

We will examine the

logic of such a position later.
The question that arises here is, what about the
words that do not represent objects?
sentence at random fram Watson.

Let us take a

-Think what it means

in the economy of time and ability to callout cooperation from groups to have word substitutes for objects cammon to all members.represent?

What . object

does 'think'

Has anyone ever seen the muscles of the

larynx manipulate the parts of the larynx or the muscles
that carry the worda of this sentenoe?

If one could ob-

serve that manipulation while the organism is thinking
would he be able from his obserTation to tell what the
organism is thinking about?
'what' represent?

Again, what object does

And what about the word 'means'?

there any meaning other than the object for which the
word is substituted?
'time' substituted?

Once more, for what object is
When that word is brought into

use by manipulation what does it signify?

And so on

with the other words in this sentence, and it is the
same with many words in the average conversation or
paragraph.
The behaviorist may tell us that the words that
are not substituted for objects are a part of the organization of the word substitutes which we use in
talking about objects.

If that be the case then by

Is
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what rule or process do we choose the organization words
and use them consistently?

It must be rather a chance

affair, without the guiding of consciousness.

It is

difficult to understand how we could receive such words
from other persons, since they might not be related to
any objects.

But that brings us to the question of

reasoning.
Lashley sees three classes of thought: (1) the
relatively unordered drift of revery; (2) the reproduction of habitized sequences, as in the flow of memorized material; (3). creative thinking, involving a
problem set and a solution reached.

"The third class

presents the supposedly creative work of consciousness.
Subjectively, the problem seems to present three phases:
determination of sequences, conflict of elements of content, and resolution of the conflict."6

This third

class is what we ordinarily call reasoning.
definition is a good one.

Lashley's

Except for the subtle words

'supposedly' and 'seems' it may well have come from an
introspectionist.

Indeed he sees that and guards a-

gainst anything but a behaviorist use of his definition by later making the statement that "the description of a rat opening a problem box is as complete an
account of the process of thinking as can be given from
introspective data.·?
Again the stimulus-response formula comes into play.
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The behaviorist tells us that so long as there is a
stimulus just so long is the problem unsolved and the
reasoning continues.

When the stimulus ceases the prob-

lem is then solved and reasoning ceases, just as the
problem of getting food is solved when the nagging
stimuli from the stomach have died away.
man's verbal conclusions and judgments.

"80 with the
The adjust-

ment is complete--the problem solved for him--as soon
as he has made a verbal (or other) response which allays, causes to l1e down, intraorganic stimuli impelling him to further verbal activity.a 8 But such is not
the case at all in logic.

When one has found the solu-

tion of his problem he finds that one of the greatest
problems of reasoning lies just ahead, that is the
proof of his solution.

We can not answer this criti-

cism by saying that the quest for the proof is the
stimulus that is still unsatisfied after the solution
has been reached.

When we reach the solution of a

problem by reasoning we get the relieved, satisfied
reaction, but it is usually momentary only.

The further

question of the proof arises at once, to answer the
hypothetical critic.

This is not necessarily a part

of the intraorganic stimulus, for the organism is often
satisfied when the solution is reached.

The need for

the proof is not felt until someone asks concerning the
solution, or unless we are not entirely satisfied.

We
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frequently foresee that and acquire the proof before
the actual stimulus is received.
But let us look a bit farther at watson's definition of solution that is reached by reasoning.

If the

solution is acquired when the intraorganic stimuli die
down, and such is an indication that the solution has
been reached, then it may be sometimes the key to the
problem and sometimes entirely apart from the problem,
having no connection with it at all.

For example, a

neighbor's boy brings an algebra problem to me to solve.
Re enlists my sympathy and soon I am interested in the
problem.

I begin to realize that I have forgotten much

. of the algebra that I once knew, and then there arises
in me a desire to solve the problem just to show the
boy and myself that I can do it.

Just at this point

the 'phone rings and my attention is drawn to a golf
game.

The boy with the problem is put aside with the

promise of help later.

A few hours later, the game

over, my attention returns to the boy.
me

th~t

But he tells

his father has just worked the problem, and has

found the solution.

That satisfies me, silences the

intraorganic stimuli, and at once I proceed to forget
the problem in favor of the evening paper.

I did not

in any sense solve the problem, yet my reaction has
satisfied Watson'

6

defin! tion of the solution that is

the object of reasoning.

It can thus be seen that
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reasoning for the

behaviori~t

is

somewh~t

mechanical and

unreliable, determined almost entirely by the condi ti on
of the physical organism.
The contribution that behaviorism would make to
logic on this point would be a very easily attained objective in reasoning.

In fact, to lower it to the plane

of allaying intraorganic physical stimuli would vitiate
all principles and standards of reasoning.

Vfuen one is

disturbed with a great problem why not just eat a big
dinner?

.All of us know thd.t a full stomach calls much

of the blood fram other parts of the body to aid in the
work of digestion.

This automatically diminishes the

stimuli to thinking.
stomach is full.

It is difficult to think while the

This is at least the natural way of

satisfying physical stimuli, and certainly it would be
much easier, and often more pleasant, than staying with
a difficult problem until it is solved.
There are two psychological phases of thinking and
reasoning that we may bring in for a brief examination
in relating behavioristic psychology to logic.
are memory and imagination.

They

The behaviorist says that

memory is merely a matter of organization.

We meet peo-

ple, get acquainted with them, learn to know them and
in thi.s way they become a part of our organiza tion.
are daily being organized by the people we me et, the
books we read and the events that happen to us.

In

We
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learning sometimes the organization is manual, sometimes
it is verbal, and sometimes it is visceral.
is a combination of all three.

Usually it

"By 'nlemory,' then, we

mean nothing except the fact that when we meet a stimulus again after an absence, we do the old habitual
thing

th~t

we learned to do when we were in the presence

of that stimulus in the first place. n9

Thus the behav-

iorist contends that after a manual act has been learned
and formed into a habit and then put aside for a definite period of disuse, some loss in efficiency occurB,
but the loss usually is not total. , The amount of 10sB
depends upon the length of the period of disuse, and
upon the individual.

"SO, instead of speaking of mem-

ory, the behaviorist speaks of the retention of a given
habit in terms of how much skill has been retained and

,

how much has been lost in the period of no practice. We
do not need the term 'memory,' shot through as it is
with all kinds of philosophical and subjective connotations."lO
In like manner does the behaviorist explain mental
imagery on the basis of physical reaction.

If a small

part of the retina is stimulated and then shaded the
person will often behave for a good while after as
though the retina were still being stimulated.

The ef-

fect is either a positive after-image or a negative
after-image.

"The two effects can be made to alternate
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by alternately stimulating the eye vnth diffused white
light and then removing the stimulus.

Under suitable

conditions these effects may persist for a long time but
they gradually diminish both in intensity and saturation.
They are capable, however, of being revived to an intense degree many hours after they have disappeared if
the eye is adapted to darkness.

They may have quite a

deal to do with the character of dreams and so-called
'mental imagery,' and may play an important part in
hallucinatory experience. nll He goes on to remind us that
the eye is always under stimulation, carried on sometimes by lens

a~justment

and change in convergence and

divergence of the eye-ball; and sometimes by centrifu. gal neural impulses reaching the eye from the central
nervous system.

Thus the retina, a delicately suscepti-

ble sense organ, is subject to stimUlation from within
as well as outward stimUlation of light.
cas es demonstrate this.

Pathological

The retina is probably over-

active so far as these internal changes are concerned
and the subjeet appears to be reacting to visual objects to which other persons present do not react.
Extreme path ological cases do not have to be called
in.

Since the behaviorist has to accept the testimony

of the subject 1n those cases, for the observer cannot
see what the subject claims to Bee and
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the behavior-

i st says it i B an apparent reacti on, why not take an av-
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erage man's word for what he sees?

Here is the case of

a man sitting down and recalling a funny incident that
happened ten years ago.

He says that he can see it all

as plainly as if it were happening at that moment.

As

he visualizes it he breaks out into a hearty laugh. That
is as clear a case of imagery as the pathological cases.
But the behaviorist does not admit it.

If he does it

is an admission of mental imagery with slightly different terminology.
With no memory and no imagery, save as they are
physically retained and recalled, reasoning is robbed
of two of its livest factors.
cerning a child.

Here is a problem con-

As I look at him I recall certain ex-

periences in my childhood days.

I claim to see certain

scenes, buildings, trees, children that were common to
me in those days but that have long since changed.

Then

as I look into this young ter's face I imagine him as
a grown man in an office managing a business enterprise.
That is my teptimony of a part of my reasoning process
as this boy stands before me.

But the behaviorist says,

"Pooh, pooh, you are an introspectionist.

There is

nothing in that for me to observe and therefore there
is nothing to it."

And so if we follow strict behav-

iorism out to its logical conclusion we will have nothing
left of reasoning processes but a juggling of word substitutes, as stimuli arise, in an imageless, memoryless,
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proofless procession of physical reactions.
The behaviorist's doctrine of word substitutes for
objects gives rise to the question of percepts and concepts.

A percept 1s the interpretation we make of a

sensory stimulus.

When we see a tree the word substi-

tute for that tree that we take away with us is a percept.

But we see scores of trees every day and so when

we use the word it does not represent any particular
tree but trees 1n general or a type tree.

This general

type word (or idea) is what the logician calls a concept.
It is the object of awareness which is not directly connected

~ith

the stimulation of the sense organs. and

which is under the individual's control so far as having them or not having them is concerned. 12 Now the behaviorist says that a word is a substitute for an object
and that it becomes a part of our muscular organization

.

so that we can manipulate it.

We can manipulate words

with other words. but behaviorism does not take into
account any ability of interpreting the stimuli which
these words represent.

They are built in responses and

may be called forth again by other stimuli.

Each word

is substituted for an object.

When we use the word tree,

which tree does it represent?

I have seen a number of

kinds of trees.

Some of them are known for their foli-

age, same for their blossoms, others for their fruit,
others for their value in providing shade, some for their
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sap, and still others for their grain of wood.

And so

when I use the word tree I may refer to anyone or all
of these types, or to a general type that includes them
and others that I have not yet seen.

This is accom-

plished by classification, but who makes the classes?
As we receive these stimuli is there same mechanical

device for pigeonholing them?
cepts and concepts.

If so we may have per-

Can we learn of such an inner

process by observation?
I I.

Deducti on .

There are in the main two types of logic, deductive
and inducti ve.

Deducti ve lo·gi c accept s a gi Yen general

proposition, or assumption, and from it, together with
a less general or a particular proposition, draws a
conclusion.

It is reasoning from general principles to

particular applications.

Since behaviorism, with one

fell sweep, has brushed aside all the general principles and conclusions of psychology and philosophy of
prior and contemporaneous times, there are left only
two general propositions (bases) from which to deduce
particular conclusions.

One is the group of defin-

itions that are proposed and the other is the general
assumptions which are characteristic of this school
of psychology.

Let us look at these two classes of de-

ductive thinking as behaviorism affects them.
Logic cannot go far without definition.

It is
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basic in all our thinking.

We have been saying that

definition is a summary in which ideas are ordered in
relation to one another.

For strict behaviorism, how-

ever. definition must be something else, for it does not
recognize ideas.

It would have to be something like a

manipulation or arrangement of words to explain reactions
and stimuli.
fication.

Definition is

largely ~ a

matter of classi-

There are at least two effects that the con-

clusions of behaviorism will produce upon the problem
of definition in logic.

In the first place all defin-

ition will have to be made in terms of the physical organism, particularly the muscular and glandular systems.
For example, watson defines language as a "manipulative
habit.-

Then he enlarges upon that by saying that "down

in the throat at the level of the Adam's apple we have
a simple little instrument called the larynx or 'voice
box.'

It is a tube made up largely of cartilege across

which two very simple membranes are stretched (membranous glottis), the edges of which for.m the vocal cords.
Instead of manipulating this quite

pril~tive

instrument

with our hands, we manipulate it with its attached muscles as we expel the air from our lunge.

• • • We

tighten the vocal cords, change the width of the opening between them as we tune the strings of the violin
by turning the pegs.

The air is expelled fram the lungs

through the opening between the vocal cords.

This causes
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them to vibrate and to give out a sound.
the voice.

We call this

But as we make this sound another group of

muscles changes the shape of the throat, still another
Bet changes the position of the tongue, another the
position of the teeth, and still another the position
of the lips.

The mouth cavi ty above the larynx and the

visceral cavities below constantly alter 1n size and in
shape so as to change the volume of the sound, the character of the sound (timbre), and the pitch of the sound.
All of these responses are called into action the first
time the baby cries."13

That is language and that is

all that language is, says the behaviorist.

It is a

very good physiological definition, but it is given to
cover all phases of language.

Such a restriction of

definition would be destructive of philosophy.

~ues

tiona of ontology, cosmology, teleology and such would
be ruthlessly pushed aside, for they cannot be reduced
to the stimulus--reaponse formula.
Another effect upon definition would be to explain
one response or stimulus by substituting another term
and so to reason in a circle.

Thus "the behaviorist

claims that there is a response to every effective stimulus and that the response is immediate.

By effective

stimulus we mean that it must be strong enough to overcame the normal resistance to the passage of the sensory
impulse from sense organs to musclea. w14

Just when io
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the resistance normal?
Another example of such shifting of ter.ms in definition is seen in the behaviorist's way of disposing of
instincts.

He insists that there are no instincts. But

he sees a number

~f

'unlearned' responses, such as

sneezing, hiccoughing, crying, smiling, grasping, the
fear response, and same others.

Two of these, grasp-

ing and fear, he treats very much in the same manner as
others would in calling them instincts.
The other general basis of the behaviorist's deductive reasoning is his group of general assumptions.
Perhaps his basal assumption is that nothing exists beyond the observing apparatus of the scientist.

Right

proudly does he boast that the scientific attitude is
that of the observer, and so he qualifies himself as a
scientist.

He observes the child, watches him grow in

behavior from simple to complex, and draws the conclusion that the child that he sees, the organism, is all
the child that there is.

Logic calls that begging the

question, reasoning in a circle.

For an example, let

us return once more to the explanation that the behaviorist gives of thinking.

On the stimulus-response

platform he explains that it is subvocal speech. watson 15 gives as part of his evidence an experiment with
a man who was asked to think aloud in solving a problem.
He observes that the man's behavior in reacting with
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words is quite similar to the rat in the maze.

He start-

ed out slowly, then went hurriedly on a trial solution,
stopped, came back to the starting point and began all
over again.

The rat worked with his feet, his whole

body being actively engaged in the project.

The man

worked with words, his entire body being implicitly involved in the action.

Now there you are.

The premise

is that man is only physical, just like a rat or any
other animal.

Then you observe the rat solve a prob-

lem by trial and error.

Then you hear a man think

aloud, using words, in solving a problem by trial and
error.

Finally you watch the man as he solves a prob-

lem without thinking aloud.

Now you draw your conclus-

ion that when he 10 thinking silently he is talking to
himself, subvocally.

And that is all that thinking is.

"If then," says Watson, "you grant that you have the
whole story of thinking when he thinks aloud, why make
a mystery out of it when he thinks to himself?"
so.

~uite

If you grant that you have the whole story when he

is thinking aloud you grant the main premise of behaviorism and there is no need of entering into the question of silent thinking.
this premise?

But suppose we do not grant

The only thing that will be left of Wat-

son's evidence will be a good instance of reasoning in
a circle.
This premise of behaviorism includes the general
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assumption that there is no conscious element in behavior.

That rules out the will, emotions and intellect.

Yet when we read Watson's explanation of language he
calls on us to initiate conscious behavior.

In explain-

ing the mechaniEm of the 'voice box' he says, "When you
think of it,
ment •
think?

~ ~

. . .16

think of some simple reed instru-

Now how can a physi cal me chani EIJl try to

Thinking, says the behavioriBt, can only come

aa a response to stimuli.

If these stimuli come from

within and we calIon the mechanism to initiate the
stimulus and bring about the reaction there

m~t

be

some intelligence or power that controls the mechanism
or organism.

Even a player piano doesn't Bend forth

music unless some power that 1s not the piano peddles
it or turns on the switch.

If, on the other hand, these

stimuli came from without suppose some of us who read
do not think of this simple reed instrument?

Then the

behavi ori st would say that the stimulus was not "strong
enough to overcome the normal resistance to the passage
of the sensory impulse fram sense organs to muscles."
But, even with this flagrant bit of begging the question,
he has called on us to help clear the way of resistance
th at the desired reaction might be stimulated.
In another connection Watson almost turns introspectionist in describing the process of building in
manipulative habits on the basis of unlearned responses.
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Here is a behaviorist describing his own behavior (within the organism).

He says, "We watch our chance and

build upon these."l?
physical action.
logic.

He means that he controls his

He is guilty here of two errors in

In the first place he employs the contrary of

his premise to prove his premise.

In the second place

he uses a type of evidence, introspective, but he rejects it when used by others.
Another phase of this general premise is the behaviorist's assumption that by reducing the physical to
the minimum he can show that there is no mental.

Thus

he observes the behavior of the infant.

CWl-

The baby

. not tell us what he is thinking and so the behaviorist
concludes that he is not thinking and that he has no
capacity for thinking.
and no intellect.

He has no emotions, no will,

He has only the capacity for making

noise and that develops into the ability to talk.

This

line of reasoning overlooks two rather important facts.
One is that the mind grows as well as the body.

Since

the behaviorist accepts the law of physical growth he
has no right to reject the law of mental growth.

The

other fact is that no one has yet discovered how much
thinking

~r

baby does.

what we have been calling thought) the
In other words it is a question of how much

potential behavior there is in the infant.

It is the

fallacy of assuming that any phenomenon can be explained
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away by reducing it to a minimum.
One other error in the logic of behaviorism may
be mentioned briefly.

It is what the logician calls

argumentum ad ignorantiam.

Thus the behaviorist says

to the introspective psychologist, "I have rejected all
conscious phenomena,now you prove to me that there is
conscious activity._18

One of the behaviorist's main

arguments is an attack on subjective psychology.

III. Induction.
Modern science greatly strengthens its method by
using both deduction and induction.

Two good methods

correctly used will add strength to any system.

Two

good methods incorrectly used will accentuate the weakness of any system.
induction.

Behaviorism uses both deduction and

If behaviorism is true the behavioristic use

of both methods must be correct and applicable in any
field of study.

Let us see where the behaviorist's use

of induction leads.
Induction is reasoning from particulars to a general statement or law.

It is the method by which we

generalize concerning more cases than we examine.

The

greater the number of cases examined the more trustworthy
will the conclusion be.

A conclusion is not reliable that

is based on just one or two experiments unless it is a
crucial experiment.

Indeed it has always been a question
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whether certainty can be gained through induction.
Aristotle said that it couldn't, unless it be complete
induction and,

~f

induction at all.

course, that is enumeration and not
Logicians now do not claim that in-

duction gives certainty.
ity only.

They say it gives probabil-

The degree 6f certainty is heightened by the

number of cases examined and the thoroughness of the
examination.

On the contrary, "false generalization

due to haste and lack of critical examination is the
constant dan@er which threatens induction. M19
This is the danger that faces behavioriEm when it
seeks the mental in the physical and, failing to find
it, generalizes that there is no mental.

It is the

error of going into a closed room and after a brief examination of the contents of the room concluding that
what is there exists and what isn't there does not exist.

As well maya behaviorist train his microscope

upon a drop of water and failing to see stars and planets conclude that astronomers are all wrong, and that
there are no planets.

Or the astronomer may conclude

that since he does not see microbes through his telescope there are no microbes.

The behaviorist shuts

himself in a roam where he can only observe the outward
'behavior of children and concludes that what he does not
observe does not exist.
It is after some such fashion of reasoning that the

70

behaviorist draws the conclusion that thinking is nothing but subvocal talking.

When Titchener raised the

question aome years ago of how the behaviorist can know
that there is any such process as thinking going on,
since he cannot directly observe it, Watson answered
that it can only be done by a log! cal inference.

"In

those cases where the response to the stimulus is not
immediate but where it finally occurs in some form of
expli ci t verbal or manual behavior, it is safe to say
that something does go on, and that something is surely
not different in essence from that which goes on when
his behavior ia explicit. n2O
inductive reasoning laid bare.

Here is the behaviorist's
With a bold "it is safe

to say· he draws a conclusion that must revolutionize
psychology, philosophy and logic.

If it is safe to

draw such important conclusions on such flimsy evidence
we may as well throwaway our logic.

Why isn't it just

as safe (or safer) to say that When one is talking in
his effort to solve a problem he is merely expressing a
process that is going on in his mind, and that Vlhen he
does not talk the process is going on without expression?
As further support of his induction Watson tells of

handing a friend a cigarette case that could only be opened by pressing a secret spring.

After fumbling around

for a long while he is put in a room by himself and told
to come out when he opens it.

After a while he comes
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out smiling and with the case opened.

"Since there are

no marks of violence on the case, the behaviorist, uti1izing logic, has a right to assume that the subject "Continued to work at the problem as he had been trained to
work at such problems and that his behavior in the empty
room was essentially the same as that exhibited by him
when he was under direct observation •• 21
the logic that he utilizes?

Now, wha.t is

It is this, he assumes one

thing and then from a rather superficial exper±ment he
infers what he has assumed.
In similar strain he employs the evidence of a deaf,
dumb and blind woman who, after being taught a hand and
finger language. was observed in her sleep talking to
herself using the finger language with grec..t rapidity.22
Once again he generalizes on one case and says that all
thinking is implicit

langua~

activity, sensori-motor

~

ill character.

Someone has told the parable of a family

of mice that lived inside a piano.

They saw the ham-

mers rise and strike the wires and they heard music.
They generalized and said that music is nothing but a
mechanism of hammers and wires.

But one day a philosoph-

ical mouse went outside the piano and observed the musician fingering the keyboard and he concluded, logically,
that the music was caused by some person striking the
keys, which caused the hammers to rise up and strike
the wires and start vibrations that we call music.

Now
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the behaviorist observes the mechanics of the piano but
shuts hi s eyes to the one si tting on the bench playing.
That brings up the question of causality that, if
it is not properly answered, may easily give rise to a
false generalization.

One form of the error in .t his con-

nection has been called post hoc ergo propter hoc.
is sequence is accepted as a cause.

That

Here is a stimulus

followed by a response, ergo, the response was caused
by that stimulus.

A behaviorist tells of a dog rush-

ing violently upon a child, barking loudly, and pouncing upon him and throwing him down.

The child cries.

The behaviorist says that the loud noise was the stimulus that produced the crying response.

He then gen-

eralizes and says that loud noise is the only stiluulus
that always produces the fear response in infants.
This is very interestingly demonstrated in the
the behaviorist explains attention.

w~

He prefers to use

the word selection, for he says it does not imply consciousness.

Then he observes that a person responds

to a blinding flash of li ght by jumping and screaming.
A more moderate flash of light would call forth a more
moderate response.

Then he generalizes that the intensi-

ty, extensity, duration and movement of stimuli are factore in selective behavior.

If there is any further dif-

ference it is due to the structure of the organism. "3irds
fly, fi shes swim, snakes crawl, and men walk because of
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their respective structural characteristics.

Obviously

the stimuli responsible for these activities are selected by receptors structurally adapted for such functions.,,23
This Bame line of argument he vall follow in explaining
differences in behavior among men.
the same

Bti~ulus

Two men affected by

respond differently.

The difference

must be due to the difference in the structure of the
two organisms.

As

a rubber ball will rebound farther

from a tennis racquet

tha~

from a tennis net, so the

cause of selective behavior is the stimulus plus the
condition of the organism at the time, because the stimulus cam es before the response.
Our conclusion of the whole matter is that behaviorism does not have a constructive contribution to make to
logic.

If behaviorism is true thinking and reasoning are

entirely outside the realm of logic.
thinking 1n terms of logic.

In fact there is no

Yet the behaviorist used in-

duction and deduction in developing his system.
them and then abolishes them.
in his use of them.

He useB

In fact, he abolishes them

Even if we accept the behaviorist's

use of induction and deduction, we would only have a system of convenience.

we

could reason as the

rad1c~l . be

haviorists do and prove any theory. ·Behaviorism destroys
all standards and principles in logic.
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CHAPTER IV
EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

Epistemology is one of the most difficult of the
philosophic studies.

That it rightly comes in the gen-

eral realm of philosophy nearly all agree.

Yet Durant,

in his recent and very popular book "The story of Philosophy,- very curtly dismisses the entire subject.

He

turns it over to psychology without any reservations
whatsoever.

In this he is rather an exception, perhaps

yielding to a desire to attract popular interest to
philosophy.

To say the least, for philosophy or psy-

chology, it is a perplexing subject.
It takes as its subject a study of the nature and
conditions of human knowledge.

The function of psy-

chology in epistemology may be distinguished as the
study of the knowing mind, or the knowing powers of the
organism (structural psychology); or the study of the
development of cognition (genetic psychology); or an
analysis of the part knowledge plays in the human life
(functional ·psychology).

The function of philosophy in

epistemology is to reflect upon the origin, v&lidlty and
limits of knowledge.

It is readily Been that the two

phases of the problem of knowledge intermingle and over-
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lap, and that a deviation from the generally accepted
principles and methods of one must naturally affect the
other.

Thus our interest here is in the problem of a

behavioristic epistemology.

That there is such a prob-

lem goes without saying.
Epistemology assumes the possession of knowledge,
as do all the sciences.
ines the basic

el~ents

Then it turns about and examof knowledge, as none of the

other sciences do: what is knowledge? whence does it
come? how do we get it? and how may we be sure of its
validity and certainty after we have it?

These are

some of the questions involved in the general theory
of knowledge.

The sciences assume that we have knowl-

edge and that what we get is reliable if it meets certain standard tests, without going into the generally
basic theory of those tests.

Psychology, being part

science and part philosophy, is involved in this problem.

And behaviorism, claiming to be only science and

yet involving itself through its negations in philosophy,
brings up certain very interesting questions.

Some of

these .we are to consider.
Heretofore epistemology has been dealt with as a
reflecti ve ·s tudy.

But ill the language of behavi ori sm it

must be a mani pulative study.

The organism mani pulates

its store of word substitutes around the general problem.
of knowledge.

When the intraorganic stimuli that raised
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or sustain the problem die away the response of manipulation ceases and the result is behaviorism's contribution to epistemology.

I. The nature of truth.
There is nothing directly stated in the behavioristic syptem concerning the existence or sUbsistence of
truth as such, but there is much implied.

As

we come to

the conclusions which these implications lead us to we
may test the main theories concerning the nature of truth,
which have been advanced by the philosophers through the
ages, by them.

Realism is the theory that champions the

objective existence of truth independent of human experience.

It is just the opposite of Idealism, which claims

that truth is a quality of the ideas of the mind and
that apart from these ideas truth does not exist.

The

for.mer is based upon philosophic dualism, while the latter is largely monistic.

As

was seen in Chapter II

strict behaviorism excludes both.

It is conceivable

that the behaviorist might hold a type of monistic
realism.

That is, he would accept the fact of the ob-

jective existence of truth if you mean that it exists
as physical objects.

But all realists would insist that

there must be something more than the objects as such,
there must be quality or relations of some sort which
could be appropriated by

t~e

mind yet whiCh would exist
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independently of the mind.

No form of Idealism could be

tolerated by strict behaviorism, for the latter excludes
all ideas when it excludes the mind and ccnscious activity.
Absolutism holds that truth exists before we acquire it, that it always has existed and will continue
to exist whether we ever possess it or not.
session of it gradually.

We gain pos-

Then there is the absolute-rela-

tive theory, which says that truth is both absolute and
relative.

It is absolute in the sense that it is inde-

pendent of human apprehension.

It is relative to the

extent that the human mind grasps it, and to the extent
that every object presents an appearance that differs according to the differences in the constitutions of the
percipients and according to the relations in which the
object stands to other objects.

Behaviorism would say

that we cannot say anything one way or another about
absolute truth.
tion.

It is useless and meaningless specula-

We can only know or know about objects that stim-

ulate us and to which we react.

And so the behaviorist

would reject absolute truth in all forms.

He might hold

to a theory of relative truth, but not the absolute-relative theory. ,
The copy theory holds that what we get is a copy
of realities.

Our ideas of objects or events are copies

of those objects or events.

This, however, would imply

an absolute existence of truth, which the behaviorist
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would rej e ct.

He would agree that the words whi ch he

uses as substitutes for objects are indicators of the
objects, but he would deny that there are such events
as ideas concerning the objects, and would thus deny
the copy theory.

The representative view is that our

ideas represent objects in their true relations.

As

these ideas re-present the objects to us we come to understand the objects in their constitution and in their
relations more fully.

That is truth.

Again the behav-

iorist would say that if you mean that the reactions
represent the stimuli then he would accept this theory.
But he would deny that he gets any ideas or mental images of the objects.

And so truth would be representa-

ti va to him only as he manipulates hi s "voice-box" in
the repetition of word substitutes for objects.
The correspondence theory is that our ideas correspond to truth.

The ideas that we have of objects cor-

respond to those objects in their true relations.

This,

however, implies some sort of absolute existence of truth,
and it would call too much for ideas for the behaviorist.
The intuitive theory is that we have truth in our minds
independent of experience.

It is axiomistic with us.

This the behaviorist would reject outright for he says
that human behavior is largely learned and that we do
not have a mind to intuit truth.

Then there is the theory

that truth is what God or an absolute mind accepts.

As
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will be shown in the last chapter the extreme behaviorist must logically deny the existence of God.

Cer-

tainly, if we have no evidence of finite mind we can
get no evidence of an infinite mind.
The pragmatists say that truth is the workability
of ideas, that it is a quality of propositions. "True
ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate. corroborate, and verify.
cannot.

False ideas are those that we

That is the practical difference it makes to

us to have true ideas; that therefore is the meaning of
truth, for it is all that truth is known as.

The truth

of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it.
Truth happens to an idea.
true by events.

It becomes true, is made

Its verity is in fact an event, a pro-

cess, the process namely of its verifying itself, its
verification.

Its validity is the process of its valida-

ti on."l
Pragmatism is a very practical and workable theory
of truth.

Since it is the aim of the behaviorists to

make psychology simple and practical, non-speculative
and non-metaphysical, it would seem that pragmatism and
behaviorism would go hand-in-hand.

And they would but

for one small obstacle, namely that behaviorism can't
support any system that builds upon ideas.

Now, if we

could change the termi nology of pragmati am wi thout destroying the principle of it we might effect an agreement
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between the two.

Suppose we say that truth is the work-

ability or agreement of unstriped muscular responses?
Is that pragmatism without ideas?

We might at least

call it behavioristic pragmatism.
We would have to come to some such definition of
truth or permit behaviorism to rule out all theories of
knowladge, for everything must be explained in terms of
stimulus and response.

Accepting this definition for

the time being let us first see how it affects the postulates of knowledge. Sellars 2 gives a partial list of
four general postulates: (1) that knowledge does occur;
(2) that the world has a determinate nature which can
be comprehended, partially at least, in thought; (3)
that the world is essentially the same for all observers; (4) that individuals can cmmnunicate and can mean
essentially the same by their terms.

The behaviorist

would accept the first one without hesitation.
is anything but an agnostic.
that.

For he

He is too dogmatic for

Furthermore he would not step into such a philosoph-

ical difficulty as to claim to know enough to deny knowledge.

He would accept the second postulate, but he would

insist that we comprehend through visceral response rather
than through thought.

The third he would accept, provided

all observers are behaviorists.

Certain1y the world is

not the same for introspectionists and behaviorists. The
fourth he would accept and more.

He would say that all
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individuals can be trained or conditioned from infanoy
to communicate with the same terms and contents.
It may be objected that this is making too much
change in these postulates.

But they must be modified

to suit our definition or be rejected entirely.

But

that brings up the problem of meaning, a fundamental, as
well as a difficult, problem in psychology and philosophy.
Meaning is the content that we put into terms, or that
terms have for us.

Words change their meaning as peo-

pIe change their use of them.
English word 'let.'

Take, for example, the

It means, signifies, exactly the

opposite of its original meaning.

We talk about the

meaning of an event or a word because it carries with
it certain signs that point to other events and words,
or because it produces certain results, or necessitates
certain types of action.
ing is a useless term.

The behaviorist says that meanIt is another one of those ter.ms

that have been used so long by introspective and functional psychologists that they cannot be made to fit into the
behaviorist's scheme.

And yet a compromise is possible

on the behaviorist's conditions.

"If you are willing,"

says Watson, -to agree that meaning is just a way of
saying that out of all the ways the individual has of
reacting to this object, at anyone time he reacts in
only one of these ways, then I find no quarrel with meaning."3

In another place he says, "from the behavi ori st' s
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point of view the problem of 'meaning' is a pure abstraction.

It never arises in the scientific obeerva-

tion of behavior.
ing is doing.

We watch what the animal or human be-

He 'means' what he does ... 4

If it never

arises in the observation of behavior it is because he
assumes it or speaks of it in other terms.

When the be-

haviorist talks of predicting behavior he is projecting
or extending the meaning of responses in relation to
stimuli.

But the general effe-c.t of Watson's definition

of meaning, if it be accepted in full, is to further
mechanize any theory of knowledge that the behaviorist
may have.

II. How knowledge is" acquired.
Sel1ars5 suggests that the claim to acquire or attain true knowledge implies four things: (1) "the abi1ity to obtain significant facts--that is, facts which
are capable of revealing something about objects; (2)
the right to use past experience so far as it is relevant; (3) the value of mental operations like analysis
and construction as means for deciphering the structure
or constitution of objects; and (4) the assumption that
the world which we claim to know has a pattern or constitution which is in some measure reproduced in facts
and grasped in ideas."
knowledge.

The se are the impli cati ons of

The facts of science must have significanoe
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as to the structure of nature.

To get knowledge is to

obtain these facts, and then classify and interpret
them--discern their meaning.
As there are various theories concerning the nature

of truth so there are different theories as to how knowledge is acquired.

We may well examine them and see which

comes nearest harmonizing with the conclusions of behaviorism.

The first to be noticed is rationalism, or dog-

matism as Kant ter.med it.

It places implicit confidence

in the ability of the reason to fathom the nature of independent reality.

It asks no mandate from some higher

authority to prosecute its ends.

What it regards as

necessary and universal is necessary and universal. It
assumes that reason is a peculiar function equal to its
task of knowing the universe.

The difficulty is that

reason is so often unsuccessful.

The problem of knowl-

edge is closely connected with the problem of error and
ignorance.

Reason alone is not always capable of mak-

ing and verifying the distinction.
Empiricism holds that all knowledge comes from experience.

It denies the existence of any a priori con-

stituents in knowledge, maintaining that at first the
mind is a blank tablet or clean slate, upon whi ch experience must inscribe all the characters.

These in-

scriptions come one by one, and what seems to be a necessary connection appears so only from the habit we
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have for.med by associating certain elements together. In
recent times there has developed a more flexible empiricism, 1n which the experience does not have to come in
a piecemeal fashion, or as an accidental accumulation
of psychic elements.

Thus William James called his

philosophy a "radical empiricism," distinguishing it
from traditional empiricism by the fact that the latter
"has always shown a tendency to do away wi th the conne~tions

of things and to insist most on the disjunc-

tions," while his own empiricism "does full justice to
conjunctive relations, without, however, treating them
as rationalism always tends to treat them, as being
true in some supernal way, as if the unity of things
and their variety belonged to different orders of truth
and validity altogether."
"immediate empiricism."

John Dewey calls his an
It "postulates that things-

anything, everything, in the ordinary or nontechnical
use of the term tthing'--are what they are experienced
as.

Hence, if one wishes to describe anything truly,

his task is to tell what it is experienced as being."
Experience is thus a method, the method, of acquiring
knowledge.

Knowled~

is itself a form of experience.

The rationalist objects that he can gain knowledge
through his reason independent of experience. 6
Kant sought a modification and reconciliation of
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rationalism and empiricism.

He adopted the basic view

that whatever is given in experience is purely mental in
nature, or, at least that it is constituted materially
of sensations.

Objects must be related in thought.

Knowled ge is impossible without a thinking mind, that
is, without understanding or intelligence.
not only receptive, but active.

Reason is

Intuition is perceptu-

al, understanding conceptual.

Knowledge consists in

synthetic judgments a priori.

tlAnalytic judgments are

always a priori; we know .without going to experience
that all extended things are extended; such judgments
are based on the princi ples of identity and contradiction.

But they do not add to our knowledge.

Synthetic

judgments a posteriori add to our knowledge, but are
not sure; the knowledge they yield is vague, uncertain,
problematic.

We demand apodictic certainty in our

sciences, and such certainty is possible only in synthetic judgments a priori. lI ?

And so empiricism and

rationalism may yet come together in the attainment and
systematization of knowledge.
Another attitude

tow~rd

the problem of attainment

of knowledge is that of the skeptic.

He either says that

there is no knowledge, or if there is we can not know of
it or acquire it.

He usually does not deny the exist-

ence of knowledge as a fact of experience, but he questions seriously most theories of knowledge.

He has a
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theory of his own about knowledge, which is mainly a
denial of other theories.
Now, what assistance can behaviorism render in
solving the problem of how knowledge is acquired?

As

to the four things that Sellars says are requisite to the
acquirement of knowledge strict behaviorism would have
the following to say: (1) we have the ability to receive stimuli from objects and to carry those obj ects,
or their equivalents in word substitutes, around with
us; (2) we have the right to use past experience, which
is merely a manipulation of conditioned responses which
have become habitized or made prominent through frequency or recency of repetition; (3) mental operations
have no value in analysis or anything else, but the visceral and glandular systeII13 re spond to the stimuli ,

;of

the various elements of the objects and to the intraorganic stimuli in such a way as to lead to a deciphering of the structure of obj ects; (4) we can make no assumption concerning the pattern of the world, we can
only react to the stimuli which come to us from the
world as it is and as it affects us.

And so the be-

haviorist would claim that we can get knowledge without
the use of a mind through physical responses and retention of those responses by the organism.
As to the theories stated above, strict behavior-

ism would reject rationalism, for it does not r ecognize
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reason apart from stimuli and response.

Kant's modi-

fication of rationalimn and empiricism would likewise
be set aside by radical behaviorism, for it knows no
compromise on the question of mental phenomena.

The

behaviorist may be a skeptic to the extent of doubting, even rejecting, all theories of knowledge except
the one which builds upon his platform, but he would
not be a skeptic in the sense of denying that we can
get knowledge.

He says that we get knowledge concern-

ing the objects to which the organism reacts, but that
it does not come through any faculty such as mind, or
reason, or consciousness.

Knowledge has been defined

. as the apprehension of objects.

The behaviorist would

say that, accepting that definition on the basis of the
stimulus-response formula (that apprehension is a function of the physical organism), he gains knowledge.
When the intraorganic stimuli, that center in the apprehension of the object, die down the knowledge is
acquired.

These stimuli naturally, or mechanically,

arise as the object, through its word substitutes, is
being organized into the unstriped muscular system of
the body.

Then the recall of that bit of knowledge is

a manipulative response to eane other stimulus, the
manipulation being vocal or sub-vocal speech.
So it would seem that the behaviorist would follow
out his conclusions in epistemology to empiricism.

Of
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course it would be empiricism with his modifications,
he would be a behavioristic empiricist.

He agrees

with the traditional view that the mind at birth is a
blank page or clean slate upon which the characters
are to be written--only he would say it is the physical organism, and not a mind, that is at birth unconditioned but ready to be conditioned by the stimuli
that it meets.

Experience, for behaviorism, is only

reaction to stimuli, it cannot involve any mental interpretation or classification of those stimuli or
responses.

That

opp~ses

James' primary claim that cog-

nition is a function of consciousness.

The behavior-

ist would say that it is a manipulative function of the
viscera and glands.
This position also eliminates the element of selftranscendence in getting knowledge.

The physical or-

ganism has no power to transcend itself, it can only
receive the stimuli that come to it though they may
come from ever so great a distance.

And so when my

friend fram interior Brazil tells me of his home, his
work and conditions there, I claim to react by seeing
mental pictures as he describes them, though I have
actually never been to Brazil.

Then, three months

later, I sit down and give myself over for a few minutes to an imaginary visit with my friend at his home
in Brazil.

Now the behaviorist says that I am merely
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manipulating the word substitutes for those objects
which he gave me.

But I would remind him that there is

no new stimulus now calling forth that manipulation,
and that those words stimulated me through my ears, and
not through my eyes, but that now I can see the adobe
home and the orange trees around it.

But that is in-

trospection and he dismisses that as unworthy evidence.
If there is no self-transcendence one wonders if
the behaviorist can formulate a working hypothesis concerning something that has not been discovered.

His

reasoning consists of manipulation of word substitutes.
In order for this thinkin c to take the form of an hypothesis his manipulation must take the form of conjecture concerning the relations which hold between
facts or lie back of them.

The behaviorist would claim

that he does that in his trial-and-error thinking.

It

may be granted that hypothesis is trial-and-error thinking, but it must be admitted that it is a rather advanced and highly developed form of such thinking.

That

strict behaviorism does not lead to such a type of thinking as we call scientific hypothesis we call Watson's
language in to show.

He is discussing how the 'new'

comes into being, how we get new verbal crec::l.tions. "The
answer is," he says, "that we get them by manipulatin g
word s , shifting them about until a
upon.

. . . How do you sup p ose

~ ew

Pat~u

p attern is hit
builds a new gown?
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Has he any 'picture in his mind' of what the gown is to
look like when it is finished?

He has not, or he would

not waste his time making it up; he would make a rough
sketch of it or he would tell his assistant how to make

°t • "8

1

This type of hypothesis which he eays cannot

take place has happened many times, according to his
own conditions.

A good example is seen in the discov-

ery of the planet Neptune.

Uranus was observed to be

out of position according to previous calculations. Adams
in England and Leverrier in France then proposed the hypothesis of another planet affecting Uranus.
ceeded to chart the course of

t~ e

They pro-

planet they deduced

(the thing that Watson said Patou would have done had
he worked according to a picture i n his mind), and on
the basis of their calculations they found that it
should appear at a certain time and in a certain position.

At that time Galle, of Berlin, trained his tele-

scope and for the first time observed the planet which
they named Neptune.

It was in almost exactly the

indicated in the chart.

pl~ce

The behavioriRtic astronomer

would have looked first at this star and then at that
unti 1 accidentally he mi [ht have observed the new planet, but he would never have charted its course beforehand.
To what extent, then, can the strict behaviorist
acquire knowledge?

A. O. Lovejoy says that "if per-
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ceiving and thinking are what Watson says they are, and
nothing more, no organism can ever know either what it
is doing or what object evokes its response; and therefore no psychological investigator can possess such
knowledge.

The only consistent behaviorist would be

one who knew nothing whatever-who at no moment of hi 6
existence could do more than relax or contract his muscles, without being aware that he was doing so.

And to

maintain even a decent semblance of consistency the behaviorist should at least refrain from professing to
know anything ... 9 Perhaps Lovej oy is a bi t posi ti ve,
but there is ground for hie general claim.

It is simply

a matter of requiring of the behaviorist what he requires
of others.
We must conclude, then, that epistemology for the
behaviorist is just another phase of the behavior of the
physical organism.

Truth is the agreement of extraorgan-

ic and intraorganic stimuli with their responses.

When

this agreement is reached knowledge has been attained
and the oTganism ceases to function in that particular
connection.

Knowledge is thus conditioned upon the

physiological changes of the body.
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CHAPTER

V

:E:rHICAL IJlPLICATIONS

Ethios is that branoh of philosophy which takes as
its field the study of morality.

It studies human con-

duot with referenoe to moral rightness or wrongness. Moral conduct is the voluntary action of a person in so far
"

as that action is amenable to a standard of obligation
imposed on him by society.

The plan of life derived

from that standard of obligation is always first adopted by the individual from the cammunity in which he is
reared, but it may later be modified by his intelligence,
emotions, will and personal experience.

As to what there

is in the standard of obligation that makes the conduct
that measures up to it moral and the conduct that is
contrary to it immoral, we shall have to determine by
examining into the various ethical theories.
Ethics is a branch of philosophy separate and distinot to itself, yet it has
all other branches.

im~ ortant

connections with

It is a study of values based on

experienoe rath er thart metaphysios.

Everett points out

that "ethics precedes and leads up to metaphysics rather
than follows its completion.

The central reason for be-

lieving in the logical priority of ethics is that all
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those values with which ethics has to do are developed
in the historical life of man, and are disclosed to
bur knowledge by methods of observation and analysis
that are essentially scientific.

Metaphysics has never
discovered a new type of moral value.- l To say the
least, ethics is in its own rights in the study of
moral values and, while it may draw assistance from
metaphysics, it relies largely upon the experiential
method.

Therefore psychology should be of material

help to ethics.

Psychology Should do more than explain

mind in the sense in which other sciences explain their
material, for it deals with material that has in some
sense at least a philosophic content.

it should leave

room for anthropocentric values, for human ideals and
aspirations, and it should present its material in
such a way as to identify its principles with some
qualitative elements in our experience.

Whether or

not behavioristic psychology does that we may see from
our study.

Watson regards ethics at present as tend-

ing toward "experimental ethics based entirely upon
behavioristic methods. n2

It is to be remembered that

there may be a deal of difference between experiential
and experimental ethics.

I. Behaviorism and the problem of moral value.
A value is a prinoiple of preference.

A moral value
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is a positive principle of preference that looks to the
good, the welfare of the community.

An immoral value

is negative in the sense that it tends toward evil and
is undersirable for the community, not in the sense that
it negates value.

We live in a world of values: economic,

bodily, recreational, aS6ociational, character, aesthetic,
intellectual and religious.

To live the virtuous life

we must choose aright among these values, whiCh, said
Plato, we must know not only singly, but in the relations which they sustain to each other and to the purpose of life as a whole.

Morality is to be identified

with the recognized virtues such as temperance, truthfulness, justice, benevolence, etc.

These moral values

are distinguishable only by conscious beings, or, we
may say, to beings who exhibit the equivalent of conscious activity.

The good is presented to us in a

satisfying manner, we are pleased with it.

Evil is

presented to us in a way that does not satisfy, we fear
and resist it.
That b+ings us to the question of what is good.
What is the summuc bonum which stands as the good of
all human endeavor?
be attained?

Is it to be found in some end to

Or is it some primary element in the idea

of duty that is dictated by some universal law of right?
The theologists in ethics affirm that the rightness of
an act depends upon the intention and the effects which

wo
the act produoes.

Acts are objectively right when they

result in the betterment of sooiety, wrong when they
produce social misery.

Formalism in ethio. discovers

the rightness of acts in the will, the desire, regardless of the results or ends achieved.

Values are thus

. determined by the relative strength and rectitude of
the desires, by the degree of

,

~~yalty

to a command or

law of unconditioned authority.
In the difference of attitudes toward this universal law, or standard of obligation, we may discern
the characteristic distinctions of some of the leading
ethical theories.

It marks the distinction between

individualism and over-individualimn which will be
noted later in this chapter, and which was the difference in ethics between Socrates and the Sophists. Plato
taught that this immutable essence of morality is the
eternal supreme "form of the good,- the supreme authority in a hierarchy of ideal essences.

Aristotle said

that morality consists in certain obligations imposed
by the desire to secure certain ends.
says it is God's law of righteousness.

Christian theology
Ethical intui-

tionism finds a "faculty" of conscience in every man; a
faculty which may become atrophied in those who refuse
to give it play, but which is an always present element
in the original equipment of faoulties possessed by every
man.

~l

Ethical rationalism, as championed by Kant, ascribes
to pure reason a constant and invariable mandatory activity, whioh operates in every individual to the produotion
of a reoognized obligation to do certain things and not
to do certain other things, simply beoause this doing
or not doing is pure reasonableness.

This was Kant's

conoeption of the moral law, his oategorical imperative.

He formulated it in the prinoiple "Aot only on

that maxim whereby tuou canst at the same time will
that it should beoome a universal law."

It has its

seat and origin in a priori reason.
I~

value?

behaviorism interested in the problem of moral
Watson says he is not.

In desoribing his method

of discovering the personality of an individual he
says, "the behaviorist is naturally not interested in
his morals, except as a soientist; in faot he doesn't
care what kind of man he is."3

But this is an extreme

position, and is perhaps due to Watson's enthusiastic
desire to be striotly scientifio and to hold within the
area of behavioristic psychology.

But he has already

defined behaviorism in such terms as to include all
human behavior, and has sallied forth to define ethios
in ter.ms of behaviorism--that it is experimental ethics
based entirely upon behavioristic methods.

Putting

these two statements together we oan certainly draw the
conclusion that there is no place in extreme behaviorism
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for a system of moral values.

II. Hedonism and perfection.
Hedonism roots the universal, unvarying form of
morality in the desire of every individual to secure
pleasure.

Pb~

ur~ being
~

.

It gets its name fram the doctrine of pleas-

J'iUY7 . hedone.
c.

It was at first egoistic

but gradually became altruistic.

In modern form it is

best represented by Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Paley, Bentham, and Mill.

Locke claimed that it is -Man's proper

business to seek Happiness and avoid misery.-

Mill

set forth a theory of universal utilitarianism based
upon the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth.

And so the

scope of hedonism has gradually widened until it has included all the ideal satisfactions of human life, even
those states of spiritual satisfaction which attend the
noblest and most unselfish activities.
Just here the distinction between psychological
and ethical hedonism should be p ointed out.

It is a

distinction between motivation and valuation.

The

motive in the pursuit of pleasure is the psychological
aspect of hedonism, while the value is ethical.

The

psychological view is prospective, emphasizing the
motive, that which is desired.

The ethical view is

retrospective, emphasizing the value, that which is desirable.

For the former pleasure is the motive of every
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act. while for the latter the value of conduot is ultimately measured by the production of pleasure.

Now, if

the behaviorist should recognize any motive power at
all in human activity it would seem that he would accept
psychological hedonism.

If pleasure is the satisfaction

of intraorganic stimuli, satisfaction being the act of
naturally allaying those stimuli, then for the behaviorist pleasure is the motive of every act.
which moves the
his week's pay.

workma~

It is that

to do just enough work to get

But the behaviorist would not be an

ethical hedonist, for he does not recognize any prinoipIe of preference which would make one pleasure more
desirable than another, and another most desirable.
True it is that one pleasure will more nearly sati sfy
the intraorganic stimuli than another, but there is no
mechanism in the bodily system that classifies stimuli
and responses into more desirable and less desirable.
Any such function or faculty would come very near being conscious activity.
The ethi cal theory of perfection holds that the
end in view in all conduct, the highest good, is the
development of inherent capacities, a process of selfrealization.

For the behaviorist these capacities can

only be realized in behavior, and so perfection is a
perfection of behavior.
entirely physical.

In this case the standard is

However, behaviorism will have to

surrender all claims to the perfection theory for it requires a faculty of knowing the capacities of the organism and the stimuli to be chosen which will best develop his capacities toward perfection, according to
strict behaviorism, but it would not be the result of
a plan of perfection worked out beforehand, it would
only be a matter of chance, samething of the trialand-error Bort, and that is not ethical perfection.

III. Behavioristic virtue.
In judging ethical conduct we take into consideration both the subjective and the objective elements. Conduct is sometimes valued according to the intentions, desires, will that form the subjective aspect of canduct__
formalism.

But more usually we place a value upon con-

duct according to the effects or results accomplished-teleology.

In behaviorism, while there may be a sub-

jective element consisting of intraorganic stimuli and
responses, the only element that we can know and appreciate is the teleological.

So for the radical behavior-

ist there ie no for.maliem in conduct.
ethical virtue of behaviorism?

V~at

then is the

It is moral training,

not training according to a system of moral values, but
according to the reactions of the largest number in the
group in which he is being trained.

The behaviorist says

that if we will take people while they are infants we can
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condition them, or train them, according to any standard
that is set up.

So if the standard is lofty the conduct,

which will be the result of the conditioning, will be
good.

This training is the virtue of behavioristic ethics.

The only fly in the ointment is the question of the standard.

If a behaviorist could not erect a high standard

for himself it is difficult to see how he could set up
such a standard for others.

Furthermore, if a behavior-

ist cannot desire or will to act according to a certain
standard save as he responds to stimuli how can he desire or will that the child shall respond in a certain
way which is in accordance with the standard, and not in
another way which is contrary to the standard?

But

these are problems that the behaviorist doesn't recognize.
It was seen in Chapter II that the conclusions of
behaviorism lead to a rigorous mechanistic world-view.
The effect of such a view is that it commits us to a
status quo, without any opportunity for real progress.
The behaviorist talks about conditioning children to respond in such a way that their behavior will be standard,
that is good and commendable.

But that standard would

have to be a mere summary of the stimuli and responses
that have constituted our behavior.

And these stimuli

that we have r e sponded to came down to us from the generation before us, and so on back.

Where would any new, or
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better, standard begin?

It couldn't begin without a cre-

ative intelligence to initiate it.
The general eth! cal conclusi on then would be individualism rather than over-individualism.

The standard

for each person would be the harmony or agreement of his
reactions to the stimuli that come to him from the group
or that arise within his organism.

The stimuli of social

environment, or of law, would awaken certain intraorganic stimuli.

When he does, or says, or says sub-vocally,

the thing that causes those intraorganic stimuli to die
away he has satisfied himself and has met all the standard that he knows anything about.

This follows directly

from watson 1 s defi ni ti on of 'soluti on ,. quoted in Chapter III.

IV. The problem of free.dom.
The controversy over the problem of freedom centers
chiefly in two theories, determinism and indeterminism.
Determini~

is the view that all events in man's mental

and moral life, as all events in the physical world,
must be thought of as antecedently conditioned, of being the necessary sequence of preceding events in whi ch
they have their origin.

This means that in conduct any

act, whether good or bad, is the necessary result of the
combined forces of the inner nature and environment of
the one performing the act.

Indeterminism is the view
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that there are events in the mental and moral life which
cannot be explained as the necessary result of preceding
condi tions or relations.

"These events spring immediate-

ly and spontaneously from the will, and appear in human
experience as a strictly new creation. u4

It holds that

the will is exempt from the principle of causation, that
it is not determined by external compulsion, nor by internal compulsion; but that man has the natural ability
to choose good acts, and that he may be influenced by
ethical motives in making his choices.
Between the two theories the strict behaviorist
would have to take the deterministic view.

His plat-

form eliminates indeterminism, for when you eliminate
conscious activity you also eliminate will, which is
one phase of conscious activity.

Furthermore. the aim

of behaviorism is to be able to predict the response
when the stimulus is known.

That implies that the re-

sponse 1s automatic, predetermined by conditioning, and
that no element of contrary choice enters into the behavior.

At least it implies that when one responds in

a certain way to a stimulus he will always respond in
the same way to that stimulus, under similar conditions,
unless he is conditioned by some external power to do
otherwi se.
The radical behaviorist insists that nearly all
human behavior is learned, there being only a few physi-

108

cal responses which he terms 'unlearned behavior.' on
the basio of which he builds in the conditioned responses.
The baby holds the bottle in his hands because they are
structurally more suitable for that than his feet.
le~rne

He

to speak English because that is the language he

hears his parents use.

As he grows he learns to play

the piano beC4use his fingers are long and tapering and
his parents require him to practise and be conditioned
as a pianist.

If he ever learns any other language be-

sides English it will be bec'use it is in the college
or university curriculum, or because he meets certain
foreigners, or

becau~e

he travels in a foreign country.

But man exhibits no instincts, no intuitive behavior,
no conscience, no consci ousness what soever.
extreme determinism.

That is

Take, for example, watson's ex-

planation of habit formation.

He says, "Some stimulus

in the outside environment or in the inside environment
s·ets the indi vidual moving.

He may move in many ways,

do many hundreds of things, before he blots out stimulus A or moves himself beyond its range.

If, when he

gets into the same situation again he can accomplish
the one or the other of these results more rapidly and
with fewer movements, then VIe say he has learned or has
formed a habit. "5

Now, if we can control the stimulus

(which watson claims to do in his experiments with babies) we can control beh&vior.

Man's conduct, then, is
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determined by the stimuli of his environment or by
previous conditions, stimuli and reactions.
As pointed out above, the strict behaviorist disclaims any interest in man's morals or moral conduct.
Now, since extreme behaviorism would make of man a mere
automaton, acting only as he is stimulated or conditioned to act, what would be the result upon the question of
responsibility and punishment for crime in a social order?

There would no

inal intent."

long~r

be any emphasis upon "crim-

It would not be fair to punish the crim-

inal, for he would say that he was conditioned by previous
stimuli to respond in the way he did, and when the stimulus arose he had no power of choice, it was merely his
organism reacting.

Then if he is not responsible what

right would society have to punish him, even by putting
him in an asylum?

Then those who were responsible for

the environment, or the stimuli, under which the criminal acted should be held accountable.

But they responded

to certain stimuli to which they had been conditioned,
there was no Bort of "criminal intent" on their part.
And

so our investigation would go on back in an infin-

ite regress.
countable.

We would find no one responsible or acThen we may as well do away with the courts

and concentrate upon conditioning children so that they
will not commit crime.

But what organism is there that

can rise above its environment, eject all element of
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crime and evil, and, vrithout any power of choice or judgment or conscience, condition children to live according to a new standard?
Extreme behaviorism, being hedonistic and deterministic, would nullify all moral codes and vitiate justice.
Experimental and behavioristic ethics would be a matter
of trial-and-error conduct without moral values of any
sort.

What advantage would there be in such ethics and

where would it lead us?

Perhaps it would be more con-

sistent to say that extreme
no ethics at all.

behavioris~

would give us
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CHAPTER VI
RELIGIOUS IMPLICATIONS

Religion is a recognition of a ·power. or powers,
upon whom we recognize our dependence and with whom we
seek to establish and maintain a happy relationship. It
is indissolubly related to philosophy for it is our effort to adjust all our theories of reality and ultimate
cause on the basis of our belief in God.

Philosophy

seeks to unify the conclusions of all the sciences on
the basis of same common principle or type-phenomenon.
Religion seeks to use the conclusions of science and
philosophy in personal relationship with the primal
cause, the uncaused cause.

Philosophy is the effort

to unify knowledge, while religion is the effort or desire to utilize knowledge to satisfy the desires of the
soul.
In a similar way religion is related to psychology.
It takes the conclusions of psychology and goes beyond
them.

It is possible for the two to be so understood as

to make of psychology a support of religion.

But often

psychology is so treated as to be antagonistic to some
of the fundamental claims of religion.

The word "psychic"

comes from the old Greek wordfd;tj7 , which meant mind or
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soul, and so psychology would be the science or study of
the mind or soul.

And so religion and psychology seem

to have much in common.

Psychology studies the mind or

soul, while religion seeks with the mind or soul (or
mind and soul) to acquire knowledge of God, holding
that in the acquisition of that knowledge we gain the
greatest happiness and blessing.

Jesus, the founder of

the greatest religion that the world has yet known,
said, "this· is life eternal that they might know thee,
the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast
sent. "1
This etymological definition of psychology was
adopted before behavioriam came upon the field.

But

because of its denial of the mind and consciousness we
are interested in studying the effect its conclusions
will have upon religion.

Religion is so intimately re-

lated to philosophy and psychology that it is deemed
fitting to let the closing chapter of

t~4s

thesis deal

with it in a general way in connection with the claims
of behavioristic psychology.

OUr study will be grouped

around three main problems: the soul, God, and immortali ty.

I. The soul.
Is there a soul in man?

If so What is the nature

of it, of What stuff is it made?

What are its functions?

l~

These que stions, in brief, constitute the problem of the
soul.

We shall not go into the questions that religion

per se is interested in, such as the redemption, the liberation, the growth, the sancti f ication of the soul, and
such like.

Our aim is to see if behavioristic psychol-

ogy, assuming that its conclusions are valid, can affect
the general claims of religion concerning the soul.
ligion claims

th~t

Re-

man has a soul, that it is of spirit

nature clothed for a period of time with a physical body,
and that its functions are to worship and serve God its
creator and to enter into happy fellowship with man its
fellow creature.
The attitude of the physical sciences has been in
the main

~

leave the question of a soul alone.

Physi-

cal science deals with the phenomena that can be handled
with its apparatus and makes no claims concerning the
realm into which its apparatus oannot reach.
that to philosophy and religion.

It leaves

Occasionally we find

a scientist who makes bold statements concerning the
soul or other questions in religion, but he does so as
a philosopher or religionist and not as a scientist.
Biology does not discover a soul, but neither does it
affi~

or deny the existence of a soul.

And so with

physiology, chemistry, physios and others.

The prob-

lem of the soul is outside their realm.
Some types of non-behavioristio psychology have

ll?
assumed the existence of a soul as in same way identifiAd with or wrapped up in consciousness.

such they

As

have dealt with its functions or faculties as threefold:
intellect or reason, emotions or feeling, and will.

Re-

ligion says that faith is an act of consciousness, but
that it cannot be restricted to intellect, or will, or
emotions as such.

When religion goes on into the

rea~

of faith psychology has assumed the attitude of noncommittal.

True it is that some psychologists have ad-

vanced into the field of religion, some being favorable
to the claims of religion while others are antagonistic.
But they do so as psychological religionists and not as
strict psychologists.

Indeed there has grown up in the

past quarter of a century quite a field of study called
I

the psychology of religion.

It should be clearly un-

derstood that religion is an open field for study.

"To

popular thought, the extension of scientific inquiry
into the field of religious experience has sometimes
seemed strange and even menacing.

But the objection

that religion is too sacred for investigation falsely
assumes that the understanding of the facts of the religious life will destroy that life itself.

.

. • When

one enters the precinct of religion one does not leave
the realm of law and order ... 2

The fi eld is open to in-

vestigation, but Bcience must remember that when it cames
to facts, or phenomena, that are beyond the reach of its

l~

apparatus it is not entitled to dogmatize upon them.
And in the main that has been the attitude of science.
However, when psychology and religion meet in a common
study where psychological method and religious appreciation harmonize much may be accomplished.

This is

not a contradiction of the statement made above, for
the religious appreciation carries beyond the psychological method in the study of religious phenomena.
Philosophy in general has recognized the existence
of the Boul, though there has been same disagreement as
to its functions and

immort~lity.

There have been some

materialistic and mechanistic philosophies that have
denied the existence of the soul, but they have been
more the exception than the rule.

Philosophy has gen-

I

erally regarded the soul as the main mark distinguishing man from lower animals.
The extreme behaviorist is enough philosopher to
have a theory concerning the soul and religion.

The

fact that his theory is mostly a negation doesn't alter
the fact that he has a theory.

The wide sweep that the

behaviorist makes in defining his field makes it imperative that

we

shall examine his conclusions and state-

ments as they reach over into the realm of religion.

In

discussing what he thinks is the religious background
of current introspective psychology watson says that people have always been controlled by fear stimuli and that
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religion has made use of that by imposing certain concepts on its adherents fram infancy on.

Then he says

that "One eXW'Ilple of such a concept i 6 that there i6 a.
fearsome God and that every individual has a soul whiCh
is separate and distinct from the body.
really a part of the supreme being.

This soul 1s

This concept has

led to the philosophical platform called 'dualism." All
psychology except behaviorism is dualistic.

That is to

say we have both a mind (soul) and a body . • .

No one

has ever touched a SOUl, or has seen one in a test tube,
or has in any way come into relationship with it as he
has with the other objects of his daily experience.· 3
This is the natural and the logical position for
strict behaviorism to take since it has taken in his

,

scope of study all human activity and at the same time
has limited itself to the objective observation method.
It seems illogical that such a self-styled 'scientist'
should assume the whole realm of human action and then
limit himself to one method of ap proach.

However, hav-

ing proclaimed such a platform he does well to hold to
it and in holding to it he is logical.
always do so.

Let us see.

But he does not

Religion is largely a mat-

ter of conviction, sometimes it becomes prejudice. Watson admitted in handling the question of thinking that
since he could not observe a man manipulating certain
organs wi'thin the body he had to infer that such was the
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case.

In other words, in this instance the radical be-

haviorist must go beyond his objective method and draw
a conclusion that is not supported by observation.

But

in the question of the soul he rules the whole matter
aside by saying that it is a plain assumption, unprovable and unapproachable. 4 The first inference, concerning thinking, is illogical while the second, concerning
the soul, is logical according to his major premise or
assumption.

But why should he be guilty of such a fla-

grant distortion of logic?
prejudice.

It looks very much like

He is ready and willing to use inference in

supporting the hypothesis that thinking 1s Bub-vocal
speech, but he rants and raves if someone else wants to
use inference in supporting the position that religion
is based upon the real existence of a soul in man.
II. God.
The second problem with which we are faced in examining the religious implications of behaviorism is
the question of the existence and the character of God
and possible relations that man may have with him or
that he may sustain with the universe.

Here again the

general attitude of physical science has been one of
non-committal.

Physical scientists have often committed

themselves as in favor of, and some as opposed to, the
idea of a

supre~e

being who rules over the affairs of

men and the universe.

But physical science as a study
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does not assume the problem of proving or disproving
the existence of God.

Philosophy, however, takes the

conclusions of science and draws certain inferences concerning God.
One of these conclusions has been based upon the
evidence of design in man and nature.

Man's body is

designed perfectly, showing supernatural intelligence
in the designer.

In like manner nature outside man

shows marks of design that indicate supreme intelligence.
Law and order are seen everywhere.

The atom is main-

tained in order like a miniature solar system with its
electrons whirling about a nucleus that is the center
of gravity.

The stars and planets are held in their

orbits and systems by laws that seem immutable.

There

must be a God to design and sustatn such law and order.
Not all philosophers have agreed in such a conclusion,
but it is in the province of philosophy.
A similar conclusion has been based upon the evidence of purpose in man and nature, teleology.

Scien-

tists and philosophers have discovered a purpose for
nearly ever,ything that they have discovered.

Certain

habits of lower animal life serve tbe purposes of higher
animal life.

Animate and inanimate nature may be used

by man to accomplish certain ends.
lead?

Whither does it all

Phi 10 sophy and reli gi on have said that there is

a higfter purpose that is in the mind of God.
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In l1ke manner the argument from "universal phenomenon" has been used.

Wherever man has been found he

has been found to have an idea of God.

Certain philoso-

phers have said that this indicates the existence of
God.

Man everywhere has the idea of a perfect being.

Existence is a necessary attribute of perfect being.
Therefore God must exist.

Others have rejected this

argument, saying that we might have an idea of a perfect island but that wouldn't prove that such an island exists.

And the first group have answered that

such is not a universal phenomenon.

And so the argu-

ment has been used and criticised through the centuries.
It is not necessar.y to go further with philosophical
proofs of the existence of God.

This is enough to show how

philosophy approaches the qu estion.

Religion uses philosoph-

ical concepts and conclusions and goes beyond them to build
personal relationships.

The Chriotian religion argues the

existence of God on the basis of revelation and experience.
The Chri st1an says that he has contact

v.,1. th

God and knows

that he exi sts.
The strict behaviorist would reject the evidence that
the philosopher, or religionist, or Christian brings on
the ground that it is introspective.

my argument to suit

him must meet the test of the objective method.
and religion say that God is spirit.

Philosophy

The r adical behav-

i ori st says, "I can't observe, touch or see or hear, a
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spirit and my assumption is that what cannot be observed by the physical senses does not exist, therefore
God does not exist."

At least he would say that the

idea of God is a worthless Bnd out of date concept.
In like manner would the behaviorist have to reject the religious doctrine of revelation.

Everything

must accord with the stimulus-response formula.

Man

can only respond with the physical organism, he has no
eoul, and so if there were a God man could not receive
his revelation.

True, God might express his revelation

in physic a l stimuli, but even then man would never know
that it came from a spirit.
The only stimulus that Watson recognizes in religion 1s that of fear.

It is the only basis of the

relations between God and man, according to hie treatment.

In "' fact it is the only support that religion has.

Re says, "If the fear element were dropped out of any
religion, that religion could not long survive."O

But

Watson has alre ady said that the fear response is "unlearned behavior."

Then religion doesn't build it in

when it makes its appeal to man.

Watson would probably

answer that religion builds upon it.

The answer is

found at least in the Christian religion, which claims
to build upon the foundation of love, saying that "perfect love casts out fear. n6
Religion says that man enters into relati ons with
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God through faith and trust.

The extreme behaviorist

would say that he knows nothing of such acts for they
cannot be observed.

Man doesn't exercise faith with his

viscera or glands and so, as all behavior must be expressed in terms of such responses, there can be no
such human action as faith.

There is, then, no way for

the strict behaviorist to enter into relations with, or
to observe, God.

The only conclusion is that he must

be an atheist, or an infidel.

III. Immortality.
The third and final problem to be considered here
is immortality.

It may be just briefly stated.

man's life continue beyond the grave?

Will

Once more science

has nothing in the way of explanation or proof to offer.
Philosophy can offer only speculation.

It is a matter

left entirely to religi ous belief and conviction.
The

ethic~l

and religious values that grow out of

the doctrine of immortality are of far-reaching
It is difficult to overestimate them.

imp ~rtance.

Thoughts that cen-

ter in the world to come have permeated the ethical standards of man the world over and are constantly influencing
his conduct.
Since extreme behaviorism rules out the existence
of the soul it is evident without further argument that
he rejects all forms of belief in immortality.

He would

have to come to such a position from two angles.

In

the first place he denies that there is anything to man
but the physical organism and we know that at death the
body disintegrates.

In the second place he denies that

we can know anything except by outward observation and
the only thing that we can observe of a man after hie
death is the decaying of his body.
In religion, then, the conclusions of behaviorism
lead to a denial of the soul, of the existence of God,
and of the immortality of man.

But it is to be noted

that the extreme behaviorist disposes of the problems
of religion by arbitrarily brushing them aside.

He

would take religion from man and of f er him nothing in
its place.
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CONCLUSION

I have given my interpretation of the philosophical
implications of behavioristic psychology.

Many will not

agree with me in all of my conclusions, but that is not
to be expected.

If I have succeeded in pointing out the

general philosophical tendencies of behavioriam I have
achieved, in part at least, the end that I set out to
reach.

Perhaps more emphasis has been placed upon the

position of the extreme behaviorist than might have been
expected, but it has seemed to me that the extreme position indicates the logical tendency of the essential tenets of behaviorism.

These lead to a mechanistic and ma-

terialistic philosophy; a system of paradoxes and fallacies in logic that could never give uniformity, or consistency, or reliability in thinking; a mechanical reflex system of epistemology that limits the acquirement
of knowledge to muscular apprehension; a hedonistic and
deterministic ethics on a trial-and-error basis; and to
no religion at all, but to a crass materialism.
Of course one may be a behaviorist without accepting these extreme views.

He may be a moderate behav-

iorist, and that might mean almost anything from a little more than an introspectionist to a little less than
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a strict behaviorist.

It is the privilege of every

thinker to examine the behavioristic theory, or hypothesis, in general and in the light of its logical conclusions, and accept what seems to him to be true and reject
what seems to him to be false.

If one rejects the con-

clusions but accepts the logic of

rea~oning

that reaches

those conclusions, he must also reject the basic assumption from which those conclusions are drawn.
If there were time and space sufficient it would
be both interesting and helpful to follow out the implications of each of the types of behaviorism listed
in the introductory Chapter.

If this could be done

perhaps it would be found that purposive behaviorism
would lead to somewhat different philosophical conclusions from some of these presented in t h is thesis.
Behaviorism of t h is type refuses to recognize mental or
conscious activity, but it does recognize the objectively observable fact that behavior is a goal-seeking
process.

This is not the extreme position that is

championed by Watson and others.

But it would be diffi-

cult to reconcile it with the denial of conscious activity, for purposive behavior implies the selection of
means toward an end, which, in turn, would seem to call
for what we have been terming conscious activity.

So it

would seem that purposive behaviorism would have to lead
to extreme behaviorism to be consistent.

l~

The near

behaviori~

that McDougall describes would

leave the way open for a variety of implications and conclusions.

The behaviorists of this group neither deny

nor totally ignore the facts of conscious activity, but
they refuse to use introspectively observable facts. It
is evident that one cannot deal specifically with such
an elastic position as this.

It would be necessary to

consider the views of each individual near behaviorist.
This would be interesting but unending.
There will arise other types of behaviorists and
their positions will lead to different philosophic
conclusions.
complete.

And so this thesis cannot be said to be

The finished and final thesis in philosophy

has not been written--perhaps never will be.
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